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ABSTARCT 
 
Populations have faced significant challenges due to globalization, demographic ageing, and 
new social risks. These challenges have brought noteworthy pressures for pension systems, 
particularly as the large baby boom cohorts begin to exit the labour market. This thesis 
considers the recent developments in pension systems in OECD countries in light of path 
dependency associated with a four-fold welfare regime typology—namely the Social 
Democratic, the Liberal, Continental, and Southern European regimes. This thesis shows that 
pension regimes mainly follow a welfare regime typology based on differential responsibility 
for welfare distribution on the part of the market, the state, the family, and local actors. 
This thesis takes the form of three distinct, though logically-interrelated, manuscripts. 
The following issues have been particularly examined in this research. First, the thesis 
examines the distribution of welfare with special emphasis on the elderly. Second, it 
examines the question of path dependency of pension policy characteristics across OECD 
countries. Third, it discusses the outcomes of welfare distribution and pension policies 
especially with reference to gender and generations. 
Based on OECD data, Chapter 2 scrutinizes the differential pension policies, and 
places 19 OECD countries into a welfare regime typology that characterizes institutional 
similarities and differences. This chapter confirms that the institutional characteristics of 
welfare regimes matter despite the convergence that might be expected from economic and 
demographic changes. Analysing the conceptual foundation of previous research, Chapter 3 
examines the latest economic and demographic trends in pension policies in OECD countries 
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in light of a path dependency approach. This chapter concludes that there is no single path for 
pension reform. While there are some variations, welfare states mostly follow their 
traditional paths, which differ across welfare regime groups. Examining the Turkish welfare 
regime, Chapter 4 discusses the welfare of the old with special focus on the pension system. 
This chapter highlights the roles of the state, the family, the market, and local actors in 
welfare distribution, with particular emphasis on the state. This chapter concludes that in 
spite of noteworthy pension reforms seeking to achieve a fair pension system for all groups, 
the Turkish pension system has still some inequality problems in terms of gender and 
generations.   
 
Key words: Welfare Regime, Welfare State, Pension Systems, Population Ageing, 
Typology, Inequalities, Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Our world, particularly the industrialized countries, has faced various social and 
economic challenges in the beginning of the 21st century. One of the most significant 
challenges that afflicts state budgets and increases financial concerns, is the increasing 
number of elderly in industrialized countries. The considerable declines in mortality and 
fertility have given rise to a gradual increase in the ratio of older to younger people in the 
population. The decline in fertility brought “ageing at the bottom,” with smaller numbers 
of young people (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003; McDonald 2006), while the mortality 
improvements at older ages have contributed to “ageing at the top” (Legare 2001; 
Beaujot and Kerr 2004; Bongaarts 2006). According to the United Nations population 
projections (2011), the world’s population 65 and older is projected to almost triple by 
the second half of the 21st century, from about 524 million in 2010 to 1.51 billion in 2050 
in the medium variant. The population under 15, however, is expected to increase by only 
3 percent during the same period, from 1.85 billion to 1.91 billion. 
Demographic ageing is partly a product of both success and failure of the 
welfare state. It is a success of the welfare state because important improvements in 
healthcare and state involvement in social services led to sharp falls first in the infant 
mortality and then in old-age mortality. Over the 19th and 20th centuries, life expectancy 
at birth has doubled from 40 years to about 80 years (Bongaarts 2006: 605). Decline in 
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mortality rates and increase in the life expectancy at birth resulted in demographic ageing 
at the top. It was partly a failure of the welfare state because some states such as Italy and 
Greece were not able to provide social and economic resources that help couples to attain 
their intended number of children. In addition to cultural changes (Lesthaeghe 1995) and 
increase in women’s education levels (McDonald 2006), social policies also affect 
fertility rates (see for example, Del Boca and Wetzels 2008). The significant gap between 
intended and achieved fertility rates might be evidence for a lack of adequate state 
support in childcare (Beaujot and Wang 2010).  
The continuing change in the demographic structure of the world’s population 
poses significant challenges to societies, economies, and families, in terms of meeting the 
needs of the various sectors of the population. In addition to demographic challenges, 
economic fluctuations brought new risks to societies through their effects on 
unemployment rates and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. In this circumstance, 
the welfare state and the distribution of welfare in a society have become significant 
discussion topics in academic and policy circles.  
It seems to me, there are two main research topics to understand social and 
demographic trends in welfare of societies. The first topic is demographic ageing and its 
challenges to social welfare. The second research topic is the distribution of welfare in 
ageing societies. This thesis mainly focuses on welfare distribution in ageing populations 
with special emphasis on the welfare of the old and pension policies.  
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1.1. Study Objectives and Research Questions 
The main purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to the welfare state literature 
focusing on ageing and pension policies. This thesis first seeks to examine the 
distribution of welfare with special emphasis on the elderly. Second, it aims to examine 
the question of path dependency of pension policy characteristics, using quantitative 
OECD data (Chapter 2), analysing conceptual foundation of previous research (Chapter 
3), and examining Turkish pension reforms as a case study (Chapter 4). By comparing 
various OECD countries, their differential pension characteristics can be placed in a 
typology that helps to understand similarities and differences. Third, this thesis discusses 
the outcomes of welfare distribution and pension policies especially by reference to 
gender and generations. Turkey, which has a social security deficit despite its young 
population, was chosen to understand particular pension characteristics in welfare 
distribution. This study shows that pension variations across OECD countries support a 
four-fold welfare regime typology.  Welfare regimes largely follow their institutional 
paths in their pension policies despite the convergence that might be expected from 
similar demographic and economic challenges. 
In light of these objectives, this thesis seeks to answer the following research 
questions. How is welfare distributed in a society? What are the main pillars in the 
production of welfare? What are the variations among different welfare states? While 
there are some demographic similarities in ageing populations across countries, are they 
following similar pension policy paths? As some claim, are all of the different welfare 
regimes becoming liberal due to neo-liberal globalization or is there some path-
dependency in these clusters? Does Esping-Andersen’s three-fold classification of 
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welfare regimes need reconstruction with new clusters? What are the similarities and 
differences in terms of pension policies among these countries? How do pension 
inequalities, especially with regard to gender and generation, vary across welfare 
regimes? 
1.2. Research Method and Data 
The methodology to be used in analyzing the welfare of the old in the various regimes 
depends on quantitative secondary data and previous studies on welfare states and 
pension policies. Since this is a cross-national comparative research, I will use mostly 
comparative data on pension policies, labour market, and demographic indicators from 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth OECD) and 
the Turkish Statistic Institute (henceforth TURKSTAT). 
The OECD data are used to create selected variables and to perform cluster 
analyses in the second chapter. Considerable institutional differences among countries 
make it difficult to obtain accurate and comparable data on pension policies. However, 
the availability of cross-national OECD data on pension policies and labour markets 
make it possible to compare pension policies in different welfare regimes (Castles 2008). 
In particular, the three volumes of Pensions at a Glance (OECD 2005, 2007, 2009) have 
been used to obtain the data for this research. Details of data, variables, and methodology 
will be discussed in the methodology section of the second chapter.  
Since the third chapter focuses on theoretical and conceptual discussions 
regarding the welfare state, the family, ageing, and pension policies, descriptive statistics 
from OECD and UN data on pensions, families, demographic indicators, and labour 
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market characteristics are invoked. In addition to evaluating the analyses of other 
researchers, my research objectives will be realized through studying the cross-national 
pension reforms and the associated OECD reports, and analyzing the way in which the 
costs and benefits of the pension systems have been distributed across population groups. 
The fourth chapter is a case study on the welfare of the old in Turkey. OECD and 
TURKSTAT data will be used to understand the transformation of the Turkish welfare 
regime, family structure and pension policies. Pension reform drafts, strategic plans for 
various state departments, such as Social Security Institution and State Planning 
Organization will also be invoked in order to understand the rationale behind pension 
reforms.  
1.3. Background, Concepts, and Literature Review 
1.3.1. Definitions: Welfare, Welfare State, Social Policy 
In order to understand the dynamics that affect the distribution of welfare and social 
policy variations among countries, the term welfare should first be examined. Welfare is 
defined as the condition of being or doing well. In other words, it is the well-being of 
individuals’ health, happiness, safety, and prosperity (for discussions, see Spicker 2000). 
The concept “welfare” is used when some action is necessary in order to enhance 
reasonable and adequate life for individuals (Marshall 1998: 701). Therefore, the term 
welfare not only includes a minimum level of income, but also education, housing, 
employment, and healthcare. Welfare can be distributed by different actors, such as 
families, religious organizations, voluntary organizations, and governments. Since 
welfare distribution generally necessitates macro socio-economic regulations, the concept 
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of welfare is mostly employed in the public policy arena. Therefore, the bulk of welfare 
research focuses on the state and state provisions.  
There is no commonly agreed understanding of the welfare state. According to 
Pierson (2007), in a narrow sense, the welfare state refers to state provisions to meet the 
welfare needs of society through social services and income transfers. In a broader sense, 
the welfare state is a society in which the state is involved in the process of redistribution 
(Pierson 2007). The term social policy is another significant concept, when the welfare 
state and its provisions are considered. Social policies often refer to government 
programs which aim to achieve social harmony among social groups. Marshall (1964), 
one of the prominent figures in the welfare state literature, explains social policy with 
regard to state actions having a direct effect on the welfare of people through social 
services and income benefits. Beland (2010: 28) emphasizes five chief social policy areas 
achieved by the welfare state: i) work, and unemployment, ii) pensions, iii) health care, 
iv) housing, and v) family benefits.  
1.3.2. History of the Welfare State 
According to some researchers, the roots of the welfare state may be traced back to the 
early 19th century. For Pierson (2007: 106), “welfare states tended to emerge in societies 
in which capitalism and the nation state were both already well established and these pre-
existing economic and state formations have themselves prescribed the limits of 
subsequent welfare state development”. Rosanvallon (2004: 20-21), however, criticizes 
researchers who consider the welfare state as peculiar to the 19th and 20th centuries and 
why associated with capitalism and socialism. For him, the roots of the welfare state may 
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go back to the emergence of nation states in Europe. Contrary to Rosanvallon (2004), a 
significant number of researchers agree on the emergence of the welfare state after the 
Second World War (Pierson 2007: 105). However, it is more accurate to assume the 
emergence of the modern welfare state in the late 19th century. In order to solve mainly 
the problems of employees and to regulate labour markets, an organized system of state 
welfare provision was first introduced by Bismarck in Germany. The introduction of 
industrial accident provisions in 1871 in Germany was the first social service, 
demonstrating the state’s role in the management of social risks. Health services in 1883 
and pension system in 1889 followed the provisions for industrial accidents. In addition 
to these social services, unemployment compensation and family allowances were 
introduced in many countries after the Second World War (see Table 1.1).  
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Table 1.1. 
Introduction of Major Social Policy Programs in Some OECD Countries 
  
Industrial 
Accident Health Pension Unemployment 
Family 
Allowance 
Austria 1887 1888 1927 1920 1921 
Canada 1930 1971 1927 1940 1944 
Denmark 1898 1892 1891 1907 1952 
Finland 1895 1963 1937 1917 1948 
France 1898 1898 1895 1905 1932 
Germany 1871 1883 1889 1927 1954 
Greece 1914 1922 1934 1954 1958 
Ireland 1897 1911 1908 1911 1945 
Italy 1898 1886 1898 1919 1936 
Netherlands  1901 1929 1913 1916 1940 
New Zealand 1900 1938 1898 1938 1926 
Norway 1894 1909 1936 1906 1946 
Spain 1900 1929 1914 1919 1938 
Sweden 1901 1891 1913 1934 1947 
Turkey 1945 1950 1949 1999 1945 
U.K. 1897 1911 1908 1911 1945 
U.S. 1930 2010 1935 1935 - 
Sources: Pierson 2007: 110; US Social Security Administration, 2010, 
http://ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
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Historically, the management of social risks does not have to be related to unemployment 
or old-age risk as we understand them in modern times. Providing life security for people 
or forming general rules and laws could be important duties of a state seeking the 
management of social risks. However, as Esping-Andersen (1999: 33) states, “until the 
20th century, most risks were not considered social, that is, a matter of state”. In the 20th 
century, we witnessed noteworthy improvements in dealing with social risks, such as 
social services and health care over the life-course. However, new social risks, which 
were not considered social risks before, were emerging, such as old-age and 
environmental problems. As Peloquin (et al. 2011: 1) asserted, “the pattern of risk and 
risk perceptions is not constant” and our perception of social risks change over time. For 
example, while insecurity and famine were the most important social risks for many 
centuries, the main social risks for industrialized countries in the 21st century may be 
poor health, unemployment, disability, and old-age.  
In the second half of the 20th century, due to the state’s ability to manage social 
risks through its institutions and resources, the modern state became an important player. 
While the modern welfare state emerged in the late 19th century in Germany, it became 
institutionalized after the Second World War with Keynesian economic policies and 
Beveridge’s full employment and social security targets.  
While the rationale behind the emergence of the modern welfare state is different 
according to various ideologies (for different ideologies and explanations see Mullard 
and Spicker 1998; Pierson 2007) the state emerged as an active player in welfare 
distribution in the mid 20th century. It could be argued that the state’s significant 
involvement in social welfare stemmed from unexpected social and economic situations 
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in post-war societies. The state’s noteworthy role continued, even increased, in an 
economic and social atmosphere based on high economic growth and mass employment 
in the second half of the 20th century. Hence, the modern state took substantial 
responsibility for addressing social risks. It sought to cope with social problems and risks 
that were previously managed by families. The increasing role of the state in the 
production of welfare meant that families played a lesser role in the distribution of 
welfare. However, in history, the family and local actors were the main players in welfare 
distribution, with production and redistribution based in the household.  
At the end of the 20th century, however, according to Pierson (2007) the welfare 
state was challenged by three main factors—globalization, demographic changes, and 
new social risks.  For many researchers, socio-economic challenges and financial 
problems often led to claims of a “crisis” of the welfare state as a result of financial 
problems (O’Connor 1973), growing social expenditures (OECD 1981), contradictions of 
the welfare state (Offe 1984), and globalization (Mishra 1999).  
According to Ferrera and Rhodes (2000), the erosion of the ideological consensus 
and economic crises have led to recasting of the European welfare states. Economic 
globalization has generated a debate on neo-liberal convergence as states are increasingly 
cutting their social expenditures and people are increasingly relying on the market for 
social services. Moreno and Palier (2004) argued that the Continental and Southern 
European welfare states have transformed into semi-sovereign political structures with 
neo-liberal ideas. Privatization of the social services and individualization of social risks 
are main markers of the neo-liberalization process. The convergence approach asserts that 
since welfare states are adopting policies of retrenchment and neo-liberalization, there is 
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a process of neo-liberal convergence of welfare states in Europe. Hence, the extent to 
which welfare regimes are stable and path dependent is under debate due to mainly neo-
liberalization process in various welfare regimes. 
According to institutionalist perspective, however, the transformation of welfare 
states is largely a product of earlier institutionalized features; and changes are constrained 
by existing institutional arrangements (Myles and Pierson 2001). The path dependency 
approach was used to highlight the effects of economic and political institutions on 
political changes in history. Institutional thinkers argue that political institutions 
constructed earlier in history have significant impacts on policy making process at later 
points in time (Jochem 2007). While the economics literature on path dependency played 
an important role in Pierson’s (2001) and Mahoney’s (2000) works, other institutionalists 
(for example, Thelen 2004) focus on new mechanisms of institutional change such as 
including layering and conversion, in path dependency discussions (Boas 2007: 34). 
However, most of them agree with the idea that the transformation of welfare regimes is 
largely a product of earlier institutionalized features; and changes are constrained by 
existing institutional arrangements (Mahoney 2000; Myles and Pierson 2001; Thelen 
2004). 
Contrary to other researchers, who assert there is a radical change in the welfare 
state, Esping-Andersen (1996) claims that since the welfare state institutionalized over a 
long period of time, it is resistant to change. For example, due to the extensive pension 
programs in industrialized countries, radical pension reforms face considerable social and 
political resistances (Myles and Pierson 2001; Myles 2002). Hence, as Esping-Andersen 
(1996) argues, the contemporary situation of the welfare state is “frozen”.  
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It could be argued that in contrast to the “golden age” of the welfare state in the 
1960s, which was based on high economic growth, full employment, and stable social 
institutions, it is more difficult for the state to cope with new challenges such as 
globalization, demographic changes, and new social risks in the 21st century. 
Consequently, one outcome is for the welfare state to further collaborate with other 
welfare actors—the market, the family, and local actors—in the distribution of welfare. 
Therefore, rather than a “welfare state crisis” or “welfare state retrenchment”, the new era 
could be defined as a restructuration of the function of welfare distribution among 
welfare actors—the market, the family, and local actors. This restructuration process 
necessitates the detailed consideration of other welfare actors. 
1.3.3. Welfare Regime 
The focus on public expenditures is insufficient to understand the welfare distribution in 
contemporary societies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2-3). Contrary to the concept of the 
“welfare state”, which is narrowly associated with public expenditures, the term “welfare 
regime” focuses on not only public expenditures, but also the market, the family, and 
local actors in welfare distribution. In the welfare regime approach, societies are grouped 
not only in terms of how their social policies are constructed through welfare actors, but 
also in terms of how different welfare regimes influence social institutions, such as the 
family and local actors (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
The welfare regime conceptualization is an effort to classify different welfare 
groups through analyses based on political economy and cross-national comparison. 
Gough (2001: 166) highlights two central features in defining welfare regimes: “(i) the 
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pattern of state social policies and programmes, usually distinguishing social assistance, 
social insurance and universal citizenship modes of distributing benefits in cash and in 
kind; (ii) the wider pattern of welfare provisioning in society, usually in terms of the 
division of responsibility between the state, the market, and the household.” The first 
feature of welfare regimes resembles the definition of the welfare state concept, while the 
second feature has a broader meaning which emphasizes the role of other welfare actors 
in welfare distribution. Hence, focusing on societies and social actors helps us better 
understand the welfare mix of societies and allows for a broader cross-national 
comparative analysis. In addition, the welfare regime approach could assist us in 
understanding state-society relations throughout history as well as contemporary 
developments in social policy literature. Using the concept of the welfare regime denotes 
the fact that state, economy, and society are systematically intertwined in welfare 
distribution. Hence, this thesis aims to achieve a broader comparative study which takes 
into consideration about 20 OECD countries with special emphasis on the welfare of the 
old in welfare regimes. 
Esping-Andersen (1999) asserts that there are three actors—namely, the state, the 
market and the family—in the management of social risks. In order to widen the welfare 
state literature, Esping-Andersen (1990) first used the term “welfare state regime” or 
“welfare regime” and he considered other welfare actors in his analyses. However, 
similar to most welfare state researchers, he generally focuses on state policies rather than 
on the social characteristics of welfare regimes. Contrary to many welfare state studies, 
this thesis emphasizes the role of four main welfare actors—the family, the market, the 
state, and local actors in the distribution of welfare. Many researchers do not consider the 
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importance of local actors as a fourth pillar in welfare distribution. It seems to me that 
local actors play important roles in meeting the welfare needs of individuals through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations, religious institutions, 
neighbourhood or kin groups. For example, while there is an emphasis on churches, 
charities, and private agencies for the welfare of the individual in the U.S., 
neighbourhood and kin groups play considerable roles together with families in welfare 
distribution in Turkey. However, there are few studies examining the influence of local 
actors in welfare distribution (Aspalter 2002).  
1.3.4. Classifying Welfare Regimes  
Welfare state researchers have mostly preferred to focus on class and political institutions 
in social policy discussions (Marshall 1964; O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984). Despite the 
importance of these dynamics in the welfare state discussions, there are other dynamics 
such as families, local actors, and gender that have noteworthy impacts on welfare 
distribution. For example, while earning and caring roles in families may be heavily 
influenced by the characteristics of the welfare state, the characteristics of families may 
also influence social and economic policies of the welfare state. These variations along 
different welfare regimes show the importance of groupings of welfare regimes. 
As illustrated in Table 1.2, the classification of welfare states occupies much 
research attention (Esping-Andersen 1990; Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; 
Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998; Trifiletti 1999). Titmuss (1974) is 
among the first researchers who classified welfare states by using a three-fold typology—
the residual welfare model, the industrial achievement-performance model, and the 
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institutional redistributive model. Subsequently, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) is the one 
who has extensively influenced welfare state discussions through using a comparative 
approach in welfare regime clustering. It is difficult to find a study comparing welfare 
states or social policies in different countries that does not refer to his study, entitled The 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Arts and Gelissen 2002). In this book, Esping-
Andersen (1990) constructed today’s best-known three-fold typology of welfare states—
the Social Democratic, the Liberal, and the Corporatist—based on 18 OECD countries in 
the 1980s.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 2-3), traditional analyses of the welfare 
state centering on public expenditures are inadequate, and his conceptualization which 
emphasizes de-commodification, social stratification, and employment, offers an 
alternative and broader approach to welfare state literature. The concept of de-
commodification refers to interference of the state with the economy so that a person can 
maintain his or her life without dependence on the market (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21-
22). Social stratification demonstrates that the welfare state not only attempts to mitigate 
social inequalities, but also recreates a system of stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 
23). This stratification is an active force in the ordering of social relations and the welfare 
system 
Despite Esping-Andersen’s significant influence on comparative social policy 
analysis, there have been significant critiques of his methodology (Powell and Barrientos 
2004) and three-fold typology (Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996; 
Korpi and Palme 1998; Scruggs and Allan 2006). Even though some of these studies 
address significant drawbacks of his study, they do not test Esping-Andersen’s 
  
16 
classification in terms of pension policies in the 2000s. Hence, one of the purposes of this 
thesis is to make a contribution to the further development and operationalisation of 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime by using OECD data on pension and social 
expenditure.  
The study of pension reforms in the light of welfare regime typology is helpful in 
understanding the diversity of experiences among different societies and the historical 
embeddedness of existing welfare groups. This approach helps to clarify whether 
different welfare states are really being dismantled and whether the liberal group has 
become dominant in the last decades.  It is important to scrutinize both the political 
process and the policy profile of pension reforms in studying the characteristics of 
pension systems and their change (Jochem 2007). 
A welfare regime typology based on “ideal types”, is useful for mapping the field 
of social policy (Beland 2010: 40) and has some explanatory value for comparative 
political sociology. Contrary to Esping-Andersen’s “ideal world” of welfare states, there 
are additional variations among welfare states, and the “real world’” of welfare states is 
likely to show more complex and hybrid forms (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 139). Having 
this in mind, in this thesis I will use a four-fold typology of welfare regime—the Social 
Democratic, the Liberal, the Continental European and the Southern European. It seems 
appropriate to classify the South European countries as a separate cluster due to the 
strong role of the family and moderate role of the state in welfare distribution. In this 
thesis, in addition to Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, Turkey is classified within the 
Southern European welfare regime. Turkey has revealed significant similarities with 
other Southern European countries through its familialistic structure, the residual nature 
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of social assistance, and patronage. Different welfare regimes and variations within 
groups will be elaborated in the next chapters.  
 
Table 1.2.  
An Overview of Typologies of Welfare Regimes 
  Types of welfare states and their characteristics Countries Indicators 
1. Liberal: Low level of decommodification; market-
differentiation of welfare 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, UK, USA 
2. Conservative: Moderate level of decommodification; social 
benefits mainly dependent on former contributions and status 
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, 
Italy, Switzerland 
Esping-
Andersen 
(1990) 
3. Social Democratic: High level of decommodification; universal 
benefits and high degree of benefit equality 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
Decommodification, 
stratification 
1. Anglo–Saxon (Residual): Right to income transfers; welfare 
state as compensator of last resort and tight enforcer of work in the 
market place 
Australia, New Zealand, UK, USA 
 
2. Bismarck (Institutional): Right to social security; welfare state 
as compensator of first resort and employer of last resort 
 
 
Austria, Germany 
3. Scandinavian (Modern): Right to work for everyone; 
universalism; welfare state as employer of first resort and 
compensator of last resort 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden 
Leibfried 
(1992) 
4. Latin Rim (Rudimentary): Right to work and welfare 
proclaimed; welfare state as a semiinstitutionalized promise 
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain 
Poverty, social 
insurance, poverty 
policy 
1. Liberal: Low level of decommodification; market-
differentiation of welfare 
Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, UK, 
USA 
 
2. Conservative: High social expenditures, but little adoption of 
equalizing instruments in social policy 
 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands 
 
3. Non-Right Hegemony: High social expenditure and use of 
highly equalizing instruments in social policy 
Belgium. Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden 
Castles 
and 
Mitchell 
(1993) 
 
4. Radical: Achievement of equality in pre-tax, pre-transfer 
income (adoption of equalizing instruments in social policy), but 
little social spending 
 
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, 
UK 
Aggregate welfare 
expenditure, benefit 
equality, welfare 
expenditure 
1. Protestant Liberal: Minimal family welfare, yet relatively 
egalitarian gender situation in the labour market; family benefits 
are paid to the mother, but are rather inadequate 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
UK, USA 
2. Advanced Christian-Democratic: No strong incentives for 
women to work, but strong incentives to stay at home  
Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands 
3. Protestant Social-Democratic: True work-welfare choice for 
women; family benefits are high and always paid to the mother; 
importance of Protestantism being paid to women 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden 
Siaroff 
(1994) 
 
4. Late Female Mobilization: Absence of Protestantism; family 
benefits are usually paid to the father; universal female suffrage is 
relatively new 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland 
Family welfare 
orientation, female 
work desirability, 
extent of family 
benefits 
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Table 1.2. 
An Overview of Typologies of Welfare Regimes (cont.) 
  Types of welfare states and their characteristics Countries Indicators 
1. Anglo-Saxon: Fairly high welfare state cover; social assistance with a 
means test; highly integrated organizational framework entirely 
managed by a public administration  
Ireland, UK 
 
2. Bismarck: Strong link between work position and social 
entitlements; financing through contributions; reasonably substantial 
social assistance benefits; insurance schemes mainly governed by unions 
and employer organizations 
 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands 
 
3. Scandinavian: Social protection as a citizenship right; universal 
coverage; relatively generous fixed benefits for various social risks; 
financing mainly through fiscal revenues 
 
Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden  
Ferrera (1996) 
 
4. Southern: Fragmented system of income guarantees linked to work 
position; generous benefits without articulated net of minimum social 
protection; health care as a right of citizenship; arrangements 
particularism in payments of cash benefits and financing; financing 
through contributions and fiscal revenues 
 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain 
Rules of access 
(eligibility), 
benefit formulae, 
financing 
regulations,  
organizational–
managerial 
arrangements 
1. British: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through 
contributions (Beveridge); low social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP  
Ireland, UK 
2. Continental: High percentage of social expenditure financed through 
contributions (Bismarck); high social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
France, Netherlands 
3. Nordic: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through 
contributions (Beveridge); high social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP  
Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden 
Bonoli (1997) 
4. Southern: High percentage of social expenditure financed through 
contributions (Bismarck); low social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland 
Bismarck and 
Beveridge model, 
quantity of 
welfare state 
expenditure 
1. Basic Security: Entitlements based on citizenship or contributions; 
application of the flat-rate benefit principle 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, UK, USA 
2. Corporatist: Entitlements based on occupational category and labour 
force participation; use of the earnings-related benefit principle 
Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan 
3. Encompassing: Entitlement based on citizenship and labour force 
participation; use of the flat-rate and earnings-related benefit principle 
Finland, Norway, Sweden 
4. Targeted: Eligibility based on proved need; use of the minimum 
benefit principle  
Australia  
Korpi and 
Palme (1998) 
5. Voluntary State Subsidized: Eligibility based on membership or 
contributions; application of the  flat-rate or earnings-related principle  - 
Bases of 
entitlement, 
benefit principle, 
governance of 
social insurance 
programme 
Source: Arts and Gelissen 2002: 143-144; 149-150.   
Following the four-fold typology, Table 1.3 presents the priority of the welfare actors in 
welfare distribution. The Liberal welfare regime is distinguished by the leading role of 
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the market in welfare distribution, with lower responsibility on the part of the state and 
the family. In this regime there are modest universal transfers, modest social insurance 
plans, and a focus on means-tested assistance. The chief role of the state is to restore the 
self-sufficiency of the individual and the family, and to deter dependency on the state. In 
the Social Democratic welfare regime, the state plays the key role rather than the market, 
the family and the local actors in meeting the social needs of citizens. This regime 
promotes a high standard of social equality where all people are incorporated under one 
universal system. The Continental European countries reflect a strongly conservative and 
corporatist tradition. The main characteristics of this regime are the emphasis on the 
preservation of status differentials, and the institutionalization of rights attached to class 
and status rather than citizenship. The Continental welfare regime is, hence, criticized as 
being paternalistic, hierarchical, and gender biased. Contrary to the Liberal welfare 
regime, the state plays a relatively active role in the welfare distribution. In the Southern 
European welfare regime, the family remains the key actor in welfare distribution, while 
the state plays a moderate role. Populism and patronage are two indirect welfare 
distribution mechanisms used by governments to get voters’ political support in the 
elections. In addition to the family, local actors have relatively higher roles in welfare 
distribution. 
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Table 1.3. 
Relative Priority of Actors in Welfare Distribution 
  Liberal 
Social 
Democratic 
Continental 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
State Low High Moderate Moderate 
Market High Low Moderate Moderate 
Family Low Low Moderate High 
Local Actors High Moderate Moderate High 
Source: Author’s judgments as elaborated in the text. 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
This thesis takes the form of three distinct, though logically interrelated manuscripts 
supported by introduction and conclusion chapters. The relevant literature and 
methodology of the studies are discussed in each chapter, as are the policy implications. 
A general discussion and concluding remarks are presented in the conclusion chapter. 
The second chapter, entitled “Pension regimes and inequalities across OECD 
countries” will appear in the forthcoming book, entitled Ageing Populations in Post-
Industrial Democracies, published by Routledge Publishing House. This chapter aims to 
place pension policy discussions in a welfare regime context. By comparing 19 OECD 
countries, this chapter first examines the question of the path dependency of pension 
policy characteristics, using OECD data on pension systems. Secondly, it analyzes the 
differential pension policies, and places countries into a welfare regime typology that 
characterizes the institutional similarities and differences across OECD countries. 
Finally, unlike the existing body of knowledge on pension policy typologies, this chapter 
examines the outcomes of pension policies by reference to gender and generations. This 
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chapter shows that the institutional characteristics of welfare regimes still matter despite 
the convergence that might be expected from economic and demographic changes. In 
addition, it is important to consider gender and generations in describing patterns of 
pension systems and inequalities within and across welfare regimes. This chapter shows 
that compared to other welfare regimes, gender inequalities are less serious in the Social 
Democratic welfare regime where there is higher social spending for women and the 
young. Generational inequalities are more serious in the Southern European welfare 
regime compared to other groups with high youth unemployment (aged 20-24) rates and 
old-age expenditures. 
The third chapter, entitled “Welfare regimes for ageing populations: No single 
path for reform” was published in the December 2009 volume of Population and 
Development Review. This chapter examines recent trends in pension policies in OECD 
countries in light of both demographic ageing and path dependency associated with the 
welfare regime typology—namely the Social Democratic, the Liberal, the Continental 
European, and the Southern European regimes. These regime types represent different 
responsibilities assumed for social security on the part of the market, the state, and the 
family. While there are significant differences in labour market characteristics, the 
demographic similarities in ageing bring similar pressures for pension reforms across 
OECD countries. These reforms address fiscal issues in state pensions, typically by 
increasing the length of the working life, placing more of the pension responsibility on 
individuals, or converting to defined-contribution approaches. This chapter shows that 
there is no single path for pension reform. While there are some variations, welfare states 
tend to follow their traditional paths, which differ across welfare regime types. 
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The fourth chapter entitled “The Welfare of the old: The Turkish welfare regime 
and Turkish pension policies,” is a case study on the welfare of the old in Turkey and the 
Turkish welfare regime. Welfare regimes of newly industrializing countries and their 
responses to challenges of population ageing and pension systems are generally 
overlooked in the study of the welfare state literature. The Turkish case, which has not 
been very well studied, is an interesting example due to Turkey’s young population but 
high old-age expenditures. This chapter highlights the roles of the state, the family, the 
market, and local actors in welfare distribution, with particular emphasis on pension 
policies. Furthermore, it examines whether a neo-liberal economic process leads the 
Turkish welfare regime to adopt the characteristics of the Liberal welfare regime. There 
are two main objectives in this chapter. First, it aims to highlight major characteristics of 
the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies. That is, it seeks to examine how the 
welfare regime has evolved in view of actors representing the interests of state, market, 
family, and local actors. Second, it aims to analyze the ways in which the Turkish welfare 
regime and its pension policies are affecting the welfare of the old across gender and 
generations. That is, it seeks to scrutinize how the pension system and its transformation 
are affecting equity across gender and generations. This chapter shows that despite 
important pension reforms seeking to achieve a fair pension system for all groups, the 
Turkish pension system has still some inequality problems in terms of generations and 
genders. The main problem for generational equality is the lack of well-paid standard 
jobs for the young, while the main problem for gender equality is gendered division of 
labour.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PENSION REGIMES AND INEQUALITIES ACROSS OECD 
COUNTRIES 
 
Chapter 2 has been removed because of copyright restrictions. This chapter will appear in 
the forthcoming book by editors Pieter Vanhuysse and Achim Goerres, entitled Ageing 
Populations in PostIndustrial Democracies, in 2011 (London: Routledge, 
9780415603829). 
Publisher link: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415603829/  
 
2.1. Abstract 
Socio-economic challenges and the need to reform welfare programs have often led to 
claims of a ‘crisis’ of the welfare state as a result of growing new social expenditure 
demands (O’Connor 1973; OECD 1981; Mishra 1984; Offe 1984). For other researchers, 
the contemporary trends in welfare state development represent retrenchment, and 
pension reforms across OECD countries are the key indicators of this development 
(Brown 1988; Starke 2006; Meyer 1998; Green-Pedersen 2002; Häusermann 2010). 
Contrary to the neo-liberal convergence thesis, however, some studies show that while 
the demographic and economic challenges are similar across OECD countries, different 
welfare states have developed varying retirement and employment policies following 
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their institutional paths (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002; Pierson 2001; Castles 2004; 
Aysan and Beaujot 2009; Busemeyer 2009; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009).  
By comparing 19 OECD countries, this chapter first examines the question of the 
path dependency of pension policy characteristics with recent quantitative data. Secondly, 
using cluster analysis techniques, it places countries into a typology that characterizes the 
institutional similarities and differences across OECD countries. This chapter looks at the 
outcomes of pension policies especially by reference to gender and generations. This 
study shows that the institutional characteristics of welfare regimes still matter for 
inequalities and other outcomes in spite of the convergence that might be expected from 
very similar economic and demographic changes. 
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 2.2. Appendices 
Box 2.A.1. 
List of Pension Regime Variables 
1. Institutional variables 
Public expenditure for old 
Old-age expenditure in % of GDP, (2003-2005). OECD 2010a, OECD 2010b. 
Government spending on old-age, (2003-2005). OECD 2010a, OECD 2010b. 
Labour force participation and retirement age 
Labour force participation rate for men 65 and over, (2004-2008). OECD 2010a. 
Official retirement age for men, (2002 -2007). OECD 2006.  
Pension wealth and pension replacement 
Weighted average pension level for men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 2007, OECD 
2009. 
Weighted average pension wealth for men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 2007, 
OECD 2009. 
Net pension replacement rate for average earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 
2007, OECD 2009. 
Net pension replacement rate for low earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 
2007, OECD 2009. 
Net pension replacement rate for high earner men, (2005-2009). OECD 2005, OECD 
2007, OECD 2009. 
2. Outcome variables 
Poverty and inequality 
Gini coefficient for retirement age population after taxes and transfers (%). OECD 2010a. 
Poverty rates for retirement age group, mid-2000s. OECD 2008. 
Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (66-75), mid-2000s. OECD 2008. 
Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (above 65), mid-2000s. OECD 2008. 
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Risk of relative poverty rate of men age (above 75), mid-2000s. OECD 2008. 
Gender inequality 
Gender gap in old-age poverty (66-75), mid-2000s. OECD 2009. 
Gender gap in old-age poverty (above 65), mid-2000s. OECD 2009. 
Gender gap in old-age poverty (above 75), mid-2000s. OECD 2009. 
 
Table 2.A.1. 
Factor Loadings for Institutional Pension Characteristics 
Variables Factors 
 1 2 3 
Old-age expenditure in % of GDP 0.883   
Government spending on old-age  0.927   
Labour force participation rate for men 65+  0.819  
Official retirement age for men  0.704  
Pension level for men   0.921 
Pension wealth for men   0.862 
Net pension replacement rate for average earner men    0.885 
Net pension replacement rate for low earner men    0.889 
Net pension replacement rate for high earner men   0.885 
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Table 2.A.2. 
Cluster Membership for Women According to Institutional Pension 
Characteristics 
Liberal 
Social 
Democratic 
Continental 
European 
Southern 
European 
Australia Denmark Austria (a) Austria (b) 
Belgium Netherlands France Greece 
Canada Portugal Germany (b) Turkey 
Germany (a) Spain Italy  
Ireland Sweden Switzerland (b)  
New Zealand    
Switzerland (a)    
UK    
US       
Notes: a) Hierarchical cluster analysis 
b) k-means cluster analysis 
This table is comparable with Table 2.1.   
 
 
Table 2.A.3. 
Distances between Final Cluster Centres by Institutional Pension 
Characteristics 
Cluster Liberal Social Democratic 
Continental 
European 
Southern 
European 
Liberal  3.85 3.36 6.04 
Social Democratic 3.85  2.59 3.08 
Continental European 3.36 2.59  3.81 
Southern European 6.04 3.08 3.81  
Note: The final cluster centres reflect the features of the typical country for each cluster. The greater 
Euclidean distances between clusters correspond to greater distinctions. 
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Table 2.A.4.  
Institutional Variables for Men 
Country 
GDP 
Old-age 
expend. 
(%)  
Govern. 
Spending 
Old-age  
LFP 
65 
(Men) 
Official 
Retirement 
Age (Men) 
 Pension 
Level 
(Men) 
Pension 
Wealth 
(Men) 
NPR for 
Average 
Earner 
(Men) 
NPR for 
Low 
Earner 
(Men) 
NPR for 
High 
Earner 
(Men) 
Australia 4.5 12.9 12.3 65 41.2 7.3 54.0 80.2 38.0 
Austria 12.7 24.9 5.8 65 72.6 11.0 91.5 90.7 70.2 
Belgium 7.2 14.0 2.6 60 37.2 6.2 63.3 79.6 41.5 
Canada 3.8 10.6 12.6 65 41.2 6.8 57.5 89.2 30.8 
Denmark 7.2 13.3 8.8 65 67.3 11.0 77.4 121.8 61.8 
France 10.7 20.1 1.9 60 51.3 9.3 65.9 84.2 57.4 
Germany 11.2 23.7 5.1 65 40.0 7.1 63.7 58.1 51.9 
Greece 10.5 23.7 7.1 58 90.6 13.6 106.9 109.0 103.7 
Ireland 2.9 8.6 15.0 65 32.4 6.4 38.4 65.7 23.3 
Italy 11.5 23.9 6.1 57 71.4 10.3 80.5 82.0 82.4 
Netherlands 5.5 11.9 7.2 65 79.6 13.9 94.7 94.8 91.4 
NZ 4.3 11.0 17.9 65 38.7 7.4 40.8 79.3 22.7 
Portugal 8.5 18.5 24.5 65 59.8 9.0 72.9 90.2 77.5 
Spain 7.9 20.5 3.0 65 74.7 11.5 59.2 84.3 76.0 
Sweden 9.7 17.4 14.6 65 68.5 10.8 65.4 83.6 78.0 
Switzerland 6.7 18.6 12.5 65 49.5 8.8 65.4 71.7 36.6 
Turkey 6.4 16.7 22.2 60 79.9 10.2 110.7 111.8 107.7 
UK 6.0 15.2 9.8 65 32.0 4.9 43.2 69.4 25.5 
US 5.3 14.6 20.2 65.8 37.9 5.6 49.4 62.2 38.5 
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009. 
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Table 2.A.5.  
Institutional Variables for Women 
Country 
GDP 
Old-age 
expend. 
(%) 
Govern. 
Spending 
Old-age 
LFP 65 
(Women) 
Official 
Retirement 
Age 
(Women) 
Pension 
Level 
(Women) 
Pension 
Wealth 
(Women) 
NPR for 
Average 
Earner 
(Women) 
NPR for 
Low 
Earner 
(Women) 
NPR for 
High 
Earner 
(Women) 
Australia  4.5 12.9 4.5 63 41.2 8.5 54.0 80.2 38.0 
Austria  12.7 24.9 2.3 60 72.9 13.0 88.6 89.0 67.9 
Belgium  7.2 14 0.9 60 37.3 7.2 63.3 79.6 41.5 
Canada  3.8 10.6 5.4 65 41.2 7.9 57.5 89.2 30.8 
Denmark  7.2 13.3 2.6 65 67.4 12.6 77.4 121.8 61.8 
France  10.7 20.1 0.9 60 51.4 10.8 65.9 84.2 57.4 
Germany  11.2 23.7 2.2 65 40.1 8.5 63.7 58.1 51.9 
Greece  10.5 23.7 2.1 58 90.9 15.8 106.9 109.0 103.7 
Ireland  2.9 8.6 3.8 65 32.4 7.6 38.4 65.7 23.3 
Italy  11.5 23.9 1.2 57 61.5 11.6 70.1 76.5 71.9 
Netherlands  5.5 11.9 2.1 65 79.9 16.3 94.7 94.8 91.4 
NZ 4.3 11 8.9 65 38.7 8.6 40.8 79.3 22.7 
Portugal  8.5 18.5 13.2 65 59.9 10.5 72.9 90.2 77.5 
Spain  7.9 20.5 1.2 65 75.0 13.5 59.2 84.3 76.0 
Sweden  9.7 17.4 7.0 65 68.6 12.2 65.4 83.6 78.0 
Switzerland  6.7 18.6 5.5 64 50.0 10.8 66.8 72.0 37.0 
Turkey  6.4 16.7 6.9 58 80.1 12.0 109.9 111.1 107.0 
UK  6 15.2 4.4 60 32.0 5.6 43.2 69.4 25.5 
US 5.3 14.6 12.0 65.8 38.0 6.5 49.4 62.2 38.5 
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009. 
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Table 2.A.6. 
 Outcome Variables for Men 
Country 
GINI 
coefficient 
for 
Retirees 
Poverty 
Rates for 
Retirees 
Risk of 
Poverty 
66-75 
(Men) 
Risk of 
Poverty 
65+ 
(Men) 
Risk of 
Poverty 
75+ 
(Men) 
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(66-75)  
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(65+)  
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(75+)  
Australia 0.300 0.27 0.25 0.49 0.24 2.39 4.34 7.05 
Austria 0.280 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.05 4.97 6.54 7.61 
Belgium 0.240 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.16 -0.42 0.17 0.02 
Canada 0.270 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 3.80 5.00 6.54 
Denmark 0.200 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.12 2.63 3.52 3.20 
France 0.310 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.07 1.74 3.78 5.66 
Germany 0.270 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 4.12 5.73 6.92 
Greece 0.330 0.23 0.15 0.44 0.29 7.80 4.15 -1.92 
Ireland 0.280 0.31 0.22 0.51 0.29 7.40 10.70 13.65 
Italy 0.310 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.08 5.40 7.96 11.30 
Netherlands 0.240 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.70 0.66 0.65 
NZ 0.230 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -1.50 -1.25 -0.90 
Portugal 0.380 0.17 0.14 0.34 0.20 1.13 1.02 0.09 
Spain 0.310 0.23 0.17 0.42 0.25 5.80 4.61 1.90 
Sweden 0.220 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.05 -0.26 3.49 7.06 
Switzerland 0.280 0.18 0.14 0.31 0.17 4.40 4.10 3.43 
Turkey 0.370 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.17 2.55 1.04 -3.85 
UK 0.270 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.08 3.22 5.21 7.00 
US 0.400 0.24 0.17 0.37 0.20 5.87 8.33 11.78 
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009. 
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Table 2.A.7.  
Outcome Variables for Women 
Country 
GINI 
coefficient 
for 
Retirees 
Poverty 
Rates for 
Retirees 
Risk of 
Poverty 
66-75 
(Women) 
Risk of 
Poverty 
65+ 
(Women) 
Risk of 
Poverty 
75+ 
(Women) 
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(66-75) 
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(65+) 
Gender 
Gap in 
Old-age  
(75+) 
Australia 0.300 0.27 0.27 0.58 0.31 2.39 4.34 7.05 
Austria 0.280 0.07 0.08 0.21 0.13 4.97 6.54 7.61 
Belgium 0.240 0.13 0.10 0.26 0.16 -0.42 0.17 0.02 
Canada 0.270 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.09 3.80 5.00 6.54 
Denmark 0.200 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.15 2.63 3.52 3.20 
France 0.310 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.13 1.74 3.78 5.66 
Germany 0.270 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.13 4.12 5.73 6.92 
Greece 0.330 0.23 0.23 0.50 0.27 7.80 4.15 -1.92 
Ireland 0.280 0.31 0.29 0.72 0.43 7.40 10.70 13.65 
Italy 0.310 0.13 0.14 0.33 0.19 5.40 7.96 11.30 
Netherlands 0.240 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.70 0.66 0.65 
NZ 0.230 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -1.50 -1.25 -0.90 
Portugal 0.380 0.17 0.15 0.35 0.20 1.13 1.02 0.09 
Spain 0.310 0.23 0.23 0.50 0.27 5.80 4.61 1.90 
Sweden 0.220 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.12 -0.26 3.49 7.06 
Switzerland 0.280 0.18 0.19 0.40 0.21 4.40 4.10 3.43 
Turkey 0.370 0.15 0.16 0.30 0.14 2.55 1.04 -3.85 
UK 0.270 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.15 3.22 5.21 7.00 
US 0.400 0.24 0.23 0.55 0.32 5.87 8.33 11.78 
Sources: OECD 2005, 2007, 2009. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WELFARE REGIMES FOR AGEING POPULATIONS: NO SINGLE 
PATH FOR REFORM1 
 
Demographic changes and their consequences for labour force participation rates are 
closely related to the formation and functioning of the welfare state. The welfare state, as 
we know it today, gradually emerged in the course of the twentieth century. For the first 
time in history, the modern state assumed substantial responsibility for addressing such 
problems as poverty, disability, and senescence. It sought to cope with social problems 
and risks that were previously managed by families, kin, and charities. Achieving higher 
living standards for its citizens has become the main responsibility of the state. Pensions 
and health services are integral parts of these welfare policies. In the early post World 
War II period, rapid economic growth rates and the rising numbers of young workers 
made it possible to accomplish the goals of the welfare state regarding the living 
standards of the elderly. Generous retirement benefits and increasing health costs are 
difficult for an ageing society to sustain, however. 
The world population and especially the populations of industrialized countries 
are rapidly growing older, as a result of declines in mortality and fertility. In the regions 
the United Nations currently classifies as more developed, the ratio of the population 
                                               
1 This chapter has been published in Population and Development Review, 35(4), pp. 701-720, in 2009. 
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aged 65+ to those aged 15–64 is projected to increase from 13 per 100 in 1960 to 40 per 
100 in 2040 (UN 2008). Longer life and better health have not been accompanied by later 
ages at retirement. Before the development of welfare states, people generally worked 
until poor health disabled them. With the emergence of the welfare state, labour force 
participation rates for people aged 55 and over began to decline starting in the 1940s 
(Myles 1984). With the institutionalization of the welfare state and more generous social 
pension plans, the trend toward earlier retirement has compounded the fiscal costs of 
ageing (OECD 1998: 42).  
A number of countries developed public pension programs before World War I, 
but the full introduction of comprehensive and universal social security took place after 
World War II (Pierson 1991). We can separate the “first comers” in Continental and 
Social Democratic countries from the “late comers” in Southern Europe and Liberal 
countries. (“Liberal,” here and subsequently, is understood in its classical economic sense 
of market based.) In the twentieth century, especially after World War II, risks that affect 
an individual’s life were considered as social, that is, a matter of state concern. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, studies in political economy developed various 
welfare state typologies (Titmuss 1974). Since the early 1990s, that literature has been 
dominated by the widespread debate surrounding Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential 
analysis of three types of welfare regimes—Liberal, Social Democratic, and 
Conservative. Several authors have added a fourth type of welfare state regime— 
Southern European (Mediterranean, Latin Rim)—to Esping-Andersen’s classification 
(Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998; Gough 2000; 
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Mingione 2001). This addition seems appropriate to us, given the continuing strong role 
of the family and the lower levels of welfare services in the Southern European countries.  
In this study, a classification into Liberal, Social Democratic, Continental, and 
Southern European welfare regimes will be used in analyzing labour market 
characteristics, including labour force participation by age and sex, along with social 
security policies, including pension policies. At the same time, countries in all regime 
categories are undergoing similar demographic trends, especially population ageing. This 
demographic transformation has made pension reform necessary, particularly as the large 
baby boom cohorts begin to exit the labour market (Bongaarts 2004). 
While the challenges are similar across industrialized countries, policy responses 
vary. The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate labour force participation of older 
persons and recent retirement policies in various welfare regime settings. Even though 
population ageing and retirement policies have similar characteristics across countries, 
different welfare regimes respond differently. By comparing sets of OECD countries, this 
chapter seeks to determine the extent to which pension reform follows a path associated 
with a particular welfare regime. That is, to what extent do the various types of welfare 
states adjust to the new challenges in ways that correspond with past institutional 
arrangements (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001; Castles 2004)? We first discuss the 
reasons for significant changes in pensioner–worker ratios in light of population ageing 
and the early retirement policies promulgated during the 1970s and 1980s. We then 
analyze the welfare regimes of various OECD countries, their pension and employment 
strategies, and their pension reform trends. 
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3.1. Understanding the Recent Problem 
3.1.1. Demography of Ageing 
The patterns of population change can largely be summarized in terms of demographic 
transition theory. The substantial declines in mortality and fertility have resulted in a 
gradual increase in the ratio of older to younger people in the population. The decline in 
fertility brought “ageing at the bottom,” with smaller numbers of young people (Caldwell 
and Schindlmayr 2003; McDonald 2006). Especially since the 1970s, the mortality 
improvements at adult and older ages have contributed to population ageing (Legare 
2001; Beaujot and Kerr 2004: 47; Bongaarts 2006). The age structure of many countries 
is also affected by the postwar baby boom. As the baby boom generation passes through 
various ages, it affects the relative size of the corresponding age group (Foot 1996; Cork 
1997). Starting in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it will bring an increase 
in the proportion of the population aged 65 and older.  
These demographic trends are largely similar across OECD countries. Table 3.1 
shows life expectancy at birth, total fertility rates, and percent of population aged 65 and 
older for countries in each of the four welfare regimes. In 1950-55, life expectancy was 
highest in the Social Democratic countries, followed by the Liberal countries, and lowest 
in the countries of Southern Europe. The differences were small in 1950-55, and they 
have since narrowed further. In 1950-55, the Liberal countries such as Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States had higher fertility rates than other countries, while in 
2010-15 the Liberal and Social Democratic countries are expected to have the highest 
fertility. The fertility trend is downward in each region over the periods indicated, with 
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the exception of the Social Democratic countries where there is an increase between 1980 
and 2010. Fertility is particularly low in Southern Europe although it is lowest in the 
largest European country, Germany, which is part of the Continental group.  
In 1980, the countries with the highest proportion of the population aged 65+ 
were the Scandinavian and Continental European countries such as Sweden, Germany, 
Austria, and Norway. While all the trends are toward population ageing, significant 
differences are expected to emerge—ranging, in 2040, from an average of 22.2 percent 
aged 65 and older in the Liberal countries to 29.4 percent in Southern Europe. The 
marked fertility decline has produced more ageing in Southern European and Continental 
European countries, while the slight increases in fertility in the Social Democratic group 
and the higher fertility in the Liberal group have resulted in less ageing.  
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Table 3.1. 
Life Expectancy, Total Fertility, and Proportions Aged 65+ by Sex in Selected 
OECD Countries Representative 
Country Sex Life expectancy at birth Total fertility rate Percentage of population aged 
65+ 
    
1950-
1955 
1980-
1985 
2010-
2015 
2040-
2045 
1950-
1955 
1980-
1985 
2010-
2015 
2040-
2045 1950 1980 2010 2040 
Denmark  Males 69.6  71.6  76.7  80.2  
 Females 72.4  77.6  81.4  84.8  2.55  1.43  1.85  1.85  9.1  14.4  16.7  24.7  
Finland  Males 63.2  70.0  77.2  81  
 Females 69.6  77.9  83.6  87  3.0  1.69  1.85  1.85  6.7  12  17.2  25.5  
Norway  Males 70.9  72.9  79.2  82.7  
 Females 74.5  79.5  83.4  86.8  2.6  1.69  1.86  1.85  9.7  14.8  15.0  23.4  
Sweden  Males  70.4  73.5  79.6  83  
 Females 73.3  79.5  83.6  86.5  2.21  1.65  1.85  1.85  10.3  16.3  18.3  24.1  
Males  68.5  72  78.2  81.7  S.D. 
Average 
Females 72.5  78.6  83  86.3  2.59  1.62  1.85  1.85  9.0  14.4  16.8  24.4  
                
Austria  Males  63.6  69.4  78.2  82.2  
 Females 68.8  76.6  83.2  86.6  2.08  1.59  1.41  1.71  10.4  15.4  17.6  28.5  
France  Males 64.1  70.6  78.6  82.6  
 Females 69.9  78.8  85.1  88.3  2.73  1.81  1.85  1.85  11.4  14.0  17.0  26.5  
Germany  Males  65.3  70.3  77.8  81.3  
 Females 69.6  76.8  83.1  86.5  2.16  1.46  1.34  1.64  9.7  15.6  20.5  31.8  
Netherlands  Males  70.9  72.8  78.5  81.9  
 Females 73.4  79.5  82.6  85.6  3.06  1.52  1.77  1.85  7.7  11.5  15.4  26.3  
Males  66.0  70.8  78.3  82  C.E. 
Average 
Females 70.4  77.9  83.5  86.8  2.51  1.60  1.59  1.76  9.8  14.1  17.6  28.3  
                
Greece  Males  64.3  72.8  77.7  81.2  
 Females 67.5  77.5  82.5  86.1  2.29  1.96  1.41  1.71  6.8  13.1  18.3  28.3  
Italy  Males  64.4  71.4  78.6  82  
 Females 68.1  78  84.6  87.9  2.36  1.54  1.41  1.69  8.1  13.5  20.4  31.8  
Spain  Males  61.6  72.8  78.6  82.6  
 Females 66.3  79.2  84.7  87.6  2.57  1.89  1.56  1.85  7.3  11.2  17.2  28.1  
Males  63.4  72.3  78.3  81.9  S.E. 
Average 
Females 67.3  78.2  83.9  87.2  2.41  1.80  1.46  1.75  7.6  12.6  18.6  29.4  
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Table 3.1.  
Life Expectancy, Total Fertility, and Proportions Aged 65+ by Sex in Selected OECD Countries 
Representative (cont.) 
Country Sex Life expectancy at birth Total fertility rate Percentage of population aged 
65+ 
    
1950-
1955 
1980-
1985 
2010-
2015 
2040-
2045 
1950-
1955 
1980-
1985 
2010-
2015 
2040-
2045 
1950 1980 2010 2040 
                
Canada  Males 66.8  72.5  79.2  82.6  
 Females 71.7  79.5  83.6  86.9  3.65  1.63  1.62  1.85  7.7  9.4  14.1  24.5  
Ireland  Males 65.7  70.4  78.1  81.6  
 Females 68.2  75.9  82.9  86.4  3.38  2.88  1.92  1.85  10.7  10.7  11.4  20.3  
New 
Zealand  Males  67.5  70.6  79.1  83  
 Females 71.8  76.7  82.8  86.3  3.69  1.97  2.02  1.85  9.0  9.8  13.0  22.5  
UK  Males  66.7  71.2  77.8  81.3  
 Females 71.8  77.2  82.3  85.8  2.18  1.8  1.85  1.85  10.7  14.9  16.6  22.6  
US Males  66.1  70.8  77.7  80.4  
 Females 72.0  77.9  82.1  85.3  3.45  1.83  2.02  1.85  8.3  11.2  13.0  21.0  
Males  66.6  71.1  78.4  81.8  Liberal 
Average 
Females 71.0  77.4  82.7  86.1  3.27  2.02  1.89  1.85  9.3  11.2  13.6  22.2  
Notes: Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table: 
Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal countries. 
Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted. The data presented are from the medium 
variant of world population prospects data. 
Source: UN 2008, <<http://esa.un.org/unpp>>. 
According to UN projections, Italy and Germany will have the oldest populations in 
Europe with about 32 percent of their population aged 65 and older in 2040. The overall 
ageing trend is seen in the average for OECD countries, which shows the proportion aged 
65 and older rising from 7.8 percent of the total population in 1950 to 10.8 percent in 
1980, 14.7 percent in 2010, and 23.9 percent in 2040 (OECD 2007d).  
Levels of international migration complete this demographic picture. In the 1950s, 
all but the Liberal cluster show net outflow, but this is reversed and all clusters show net 
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inflow by 1980. Other than Spain, the European regions are similar in 2005, with net in-
migration of some 2.5 persons per 1000 population (UN 2008). Net immigration has 
increased the most in the Liberal countries, with an average level of 5.8 per 1000 
population in 2005 (UN 2008). 
3.1.2. Labour Market and Retirement 
The significance of population ageing for welfare expenditures is affected by changing 
labour force participation. Especially in the second half of the twentieth century, the 
labour market underwent rapid changes, associated particularly with women’s higher 
participation. At ages 25–54, men’s labour force participation rates in the selected 
countries in 2005 are uniformly high, but women’s rates range from an average of 85 
percent for the Scandinavian region to 65 percent in Southern Europe (OECD 2007a). At 
ages 15–24, women’s rates are highest in the Liberal and Social Democratic welfare 
states, while men’s rates are highest in the Liberal group, followed by Social Democratic 
and Continental countries, and lowest for Southern Europe. 
Table 3.2 presents labour force participation rates for men and women in the age 
group 55–64 for countries in the four welfare regimes. The declining labour force 
participation of older men in many industrialized countries is one of the most prominent 
economic trends of the period between 1970 and 2000. While the OECD average labour 
force participation rate for ages 55–64 was 78.6 percent for males in 1970, it fell to 62.7 
percent by 2000. Male rates in all welfare regimes subsequently increased between 2000 
and 2005. Even though women’s participation at ages 55–64 has increased from 37.2 
  
44 
percent in 1970 to 43.8 percent by 2005, this rise has not compensated for the longer term 
decline in men’s rates at these ages. 
 
Table 3.2. 
Labour force participation rates (in percent) at ages 55–64 by sex in selected OECD countries 
representative of four welfare regimes, 1970–2005 
Country Males Females 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Denmark - - 69.1 64.5 70.2 - - 45.9 48.2 55.7 
Finland 73.9 56.9 47.1 48.1 56.5 45.2 43.8 40.8 45.2 56.4 
Norway - 79.5 72.8 74.4 74.6 - 49.8 53.9 61.6 62.9 
Sweden 85.4 78.6 75.5 72.8 76.4 44.5 55.3 65.8 65.9 69.2 
S.D. Average 79.6 71.7 66.1 65.0 69.4 44.8 49.6 51.6 55.3 61.1 
Austria - - - 42.8 43.0 - - - 17.6 23.6 
France 75.4 68.6 45.8 41.7 43.9 40.0 40.1 31.1 33.0 37.9 
Germany 80.2 67.3 60.5 52.4 61.3 28.5 28.9 27.8 33.5 43.2 
Netherlands - 63.2 45.7 50.8 58.0 - 14.4 16.7 26.0 36.0 
C.E. Average 77.8 66.3 50.7 46.9 51.6 34.2 27.8 25.2 27.5 35.2 
Greece - - 59.5 57.3 60.7 - - 24.3 25.5 26.9 
Italy 48.2 39.6 53.0 42.7 44.3 10.6 11.0 15.5 16.1 21.5 
Spain - 75.9 62.5 60.5 63.2 - 21.0 19.4 22.6 29.6 
S.E. Average 48.2 57.8 58.3 53.5 56.1 10.6 16.0 19.7 21.4 26.0 
Canada - 74.5 64.0 60.7 66.7 - 32.6 34.9 41.4 49.4 
Ireland - - 65.0 64.7 67.7 - - 19.9 27.8 38.4 
New Zealand - - 56.8 72.2 79.7 - - 30.7 47.9 62.5 
UK - - 68.1 63.3 67.9 - - 38.7 42.5 48.9 
US 83.0 72.1 67.8 67.3 69.3 43.0 41.3 45.2 51.9 57.0 
Liberal Average 83.0 73.3 64.4 65.6 70.3 43.0 37.0 33.9 42.3 51.3 
OECD total 78.6 72.6 65.6 62.7 65.6 37.2 37.0 36.2 38.7 43.8 
Notes: Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table: 
Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal 
countries. Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted. OECD total covers all 
OECD countries. 
Source: OECD 2009, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx. 
 
Analyses have shown that public pension systems and generous benefits for the 
unemployed tend to reduce labour force participation at older ages in many OECD 
countries (Duval 2003). In the last three decades of the twentieth century, many people 
retired before they qualified for standard pensions. Some of these pathways to retirement 
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were paved by social transfer programs such as disability, unemployment, and early 
retirement schemes. Some countries such as France and New Zealand reduced the 
standard age of eligibility for pension benefits in the 1970s and 1980s. When people 
reach the standard or early retirement age, their retirement decisions will depend not only 
on the level of pensions in comparison to employment income, but also on the expected 
gain from staying in the labour force in comparison to withdrawing from work. If 
working longer is compensated by a rise in future pension benefits or if early retirement 
benefits are not seen to be sufficiently high, people are more likely to stay in the labour 
force (OECD 2004b). In many OECD countries, however, public policies have prompted 
a significant number of people to retire as soon as they reach the age of pension 
entitlement. In their comparative study, Gruber and Wise (1999) show that many 
industrialized countries have strong social security incentives for people to retire early. 
Labour force participation at ages 55–64 shows marked differences across the 
four welfare regimes. It is lowest in Southern Europe, partly because of women’s low 
labour force participation. In 1990 in the three representative countries only 19.7 percent 
of women aged 55–64 were in the labour force, and low female participation continued in 
the early twenty-first century. Women’s participation rates are also low in Continental 
Europe, with a low point of 25.2 percent of women aged 55–64 in the labour force in 
1990, rising to 35.2 percent in 2005. Female participation rates were higher in the other 
two clusters, reaching 51.3 percent in the Liberal countries and 61.1 percent in the Social 
Democratic countries by 2005.  
The labour force participation rate of men in the 55–64 age group also shows 
distinct differences among welfare regime clusters. Social Democratic and Liberal 
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countries have generally higher male participation rates; Continental Europe and 
Southern Europe have relatively low rates. These differences across welfare regimes 
reflect not only policies toward early retirement, but also broader labour market and 
social policies. The high rates at ages 55–64 in the Social Democratic group reflect a 
need for extensive labour force participation to fund generous social benefits. The high 
rates in the Liberal countries follow from their less generous pension policies, especially 
for those taking early retirement. The low rates in Southern Europe reflect the 
expectations placed on families for old-age security, and thus on women playing 
caretaking rather than labour force roles. 
3.2. Different Regimes, Similar Policies?  
The study of pension reforms in the different welfare regimes is useful in understanding 
the diversity of experiences between countries. It helps to determine whether certain 
welfare states are really being dismantled and whether the Liberal group’s approach has 
become dominant in recent decades. In studying the characteristics of pension policies 
and their changes, we discuss both the management of social risks in ageing societies and 
the policy profile of pension reforms.  
Different welfare regime types represent different responsibilities assumed by the 
market, the state, and the family in the management of social risks and social security 
(see Table 3.3). The Liberal welfare regime is distinguished by the dominant role of the 
market in the management of social risks with lower responsibility on the part of the state 
and the family. In the welfare states of the Social Democratic regime, the state plays a 
larger role than the market and the family in meeting the social needs of citizens. While 
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all of the these actors play a moderate role in the management of social risks in the 
Continental European group, the family remains the key actor in the Southern European 
group. 
The extent to which welfare regimes are stable and path dependent is under 
debate (Taylor-Gooby 1998; Rein and Schmähl 2004). A pattern of path dependency 
occurs when institutions and programs, once established, become difficult to reverse 
(Pierson 1996, 2001; Myles and Pierson 2001; Wood 2001). Consequently, the 
transformation of welfare regimes is largely a product of earlier institutionalized features, 
and changes are constrained by existing institutional arrangements (Myles and Pierson 
2001). Pierson’s (2001) conceptualization focuses on welfare state restructuring along 
three dimensions: cost containment, recalibration, and re-commodification (see Table 
3.3).  
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Table 3.3. 
Characteristics of pension reforms within four welfare regimes: Relative priority of 
components of social risk management and pension reform agenda 
  Social democratic Continental Europe  Southern Europe  Liberal 
Management of social risk Relative Priority 
State High Moderate Moderate Low 
Family Low Moderate High Low 
Market Low Moderate Moderate High 
Pension Reform Agenda     
Cost containment High High Moderate Moderate 
Recalibration Moderate Moderate High Low 
Re-commodification Low Moderate Moderate High 
Notes: Cost containment: reforms that mostly seek to balance budgets and maintain the existing system. 
Recalibration: reforms that change regulations to reduce inefficiency or to update pension systems 
following on evolving conditions. Re-commodification: reforms that increase the individual’s 
dependence on the market for social security. 
These dimensions are useful in evaluating recent pension reforms and the transformation 
of the welfare state. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), as markets became 
hegemonic the welfare of an individual began to depend entirely on the cash economy, 
and maintaining a livelihood without relying on the market became almost impossible. 
This is called the commodification of the individual. De-commodification “occurs when a 
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood 
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21–22). Re commodification, on 
the other hand, is one of the most significant aspects of welfare state transformation, 
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namely the effort to reverse dependence on the state through tightening eligibility or 
cutting benefits (Pierson 2001: 422). Re-commodification is therefore concerned with 
dismantling some aspects of the welfare state that protect individuals from market 
pressures. Many welfare states experience budgetary constraints, often a response to 
concerns that pension policies are not sustainable. Cost containment responds to 
pressures on government budgets and seeks reforms associated with government 
expenditures (ibid.: 424). Unlike re-commodification, these policy initiatives focus on 
deficit reduction and cost containment to maintain the existing system. By recalibration, 
Pierson (ibid.: 425) means welfare reforms through the removal of inefficient regulations. 
Recalibration consists of two kinds of change: rationalization (modification of social 
policies in line with new ideas for achieving welfare targets) and updating (adapting 
social programs to changes in the economy and society) (ibid.: 425). As indicated in 
Table 3.3, we propose that cost containment has been more central to the retirement 
policies of Social Democratic countries and Continental Europe, while Liberal welfare 
states focus mainly on increasing the role of the individual in the market (re-
commodification), and Southern European welfare states focus on changing regulations 
(recalibration). In order to determine whether there is a dismantlement of welfare states 
or a pattern of path dependency, we need to scrutinize recent pension reforms in each 
welfare regime cluster in light of the categories in Table 3.3. 
3.2.1. The Liberal Regime 
The Liberal welfare regime (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United 
States) is distinguished by the dominant role of the market in the management of social 
risks and by the modest extent and scale of universal transfers, modest social insurance 
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plans, and means-tested social assistance. In this regime, social welfare arrangements 
have been severely circumscribed by norms of Liberal work ethics, which limit welfare 
provision to marginal groups such as single mothers, the disabled, the elderly, and the 
poor (Esping-Andersen 1999: 40). There is an emphasis on local communities (churches, 
charities, private agencies) and on the market to provide for the welfare of the individual 
(ibid.: 33). As compared with the Continental and Southern European welfare regimes, 
women have higher participation rates in the labour market. Compared to the averages for 
the other regions, we find less population ageing in the countries following the Liberal 
model, along with relatively high labour force participation of both sexes at ages 55–64 
and older retirement ages (Table 3.2). These countries lack egalitarian provisions, and 
average wages are lower than in other welfare regimes (ibid.). The problems of budget 
deficits and unemployment are largely avoided through policies that support the 
expansion of low-wage private-sector employment. 
In the Liberal welfare states, pension reforms have focused on cost containment 
and re-commodification, which follow central aspects of the institutional structure of this 
regime (Pierson 2001). Many countries in this group have reduced social transfers in the 
last two decades. Reforms have concentrated on targeting pension systems to persons in 
need and finding measures to increase the coverage of private pensions through tax 
incentives. These countries are preceding other countries in retirement benefit 
privatization to reduce long-term pension expenditure. Employees are encouraged to opt 
for private pension plans, with government support through tax exemptions. In the United 
Kingdom in the late 1980s, workers were permitted to select private pension plans 
according to their needs and contributions. While 42 percent of all households in the 
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United States owned Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 40 percent of workers in 
Canada were covered by Registered Pension Plans (OECD 2005b: 80; OECD 2005a: 74). 
Although the public pension system is the basic source of income for retirees in many 
OECD countries, employer-provided pension plans are becoming important sources of 
retirement income especially for the upper middle class. Analyses by the OECD (2000, 
2004b, 2005a, 2005b) reveal that recent reforms in Liberal countries have strengthened 
the financial sustainability of old-age pensions, and these reforms have been more 
successful than those in other countries.  
As shown in Table 3.4, public social expenditures and public old-age 
expenditures in the Liberal countries have been relatively low compared to expenditures 
in other welfare states, and these expenditures are predicted to remain relatively small in 
2050 (OECD 2005b). Compared to other regions, the net replacement rate of public 
pensions represents an average of only 46 percent of former earnings (see Table 3.4 for 
definition of net replacement). Moreover, similar to reforms in other welfare regimes, 
these countries have also increased the age at retirement. The full pension age increased 
from 65 to 67 years in the United States, and the pension age increased from 60 to 65 in 
New Zealand. In the United Kingdom the pension age for women and eligibility for 
guaranteed credit increased from 60 to 65 years in 2004. Some differences in cost 
containment and re-commodification of pension policies over time are found across 
countries in the Liberal welfare regime. For example, the relative low income rate, which 
measures the proportion of persons below half of the median family income in each 
country, is only 5.4 percent for Canadian seniors, compared to 24.7 percent in the US in 
the late 1990s (Picot and Myles 2005: 12). Even though there have been some variations 
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in retirement policies and pension reforms among Liberal countries, there has been no 
convergence by Liberal countries toward other welfare regimes (Myles and Pierson 
2001). These countries have followed their traditional path. 
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Table 3.4. 
Total public expenditure and public pension expenditure as a 
percent of GDP, net replacement rates, and average effective age of retirement 
in selected OECD countries representative of four welfare regimes 
Country 
 
 
 
Total public social 
expenditure in 
percentage of GDP 
(2001) i 
Public pension 
expenditure  in 
percentage of GDP 
(2001) ii 
Net replacement 
rate at average 
earnings (2007) in 
percent iii 
Average effective 
age of retirement 
(2005) 
 
    Males  Females 
Denmark 29.2 6.5 87 64.1 61.4 
Finland 24.8 8.0 71 60.5 60.1 
Norway 23.9 4.8 69 63.9 62.2 
Sweden 28.9 7.4 64 65.5 62.5 
S.D. Average 26.7 6.7 73 63.5 61.6 
Austria 26.0 12.9 91 59.1 58.1 
France 28.5 11.9 63 58.5 59.2 
Germany 27.4 11.2 40 61.7 60.7 
Netherlands 21.8 6.4 97 60.2 60.5 
C.E. Average 25.9 10.6 73 59.9 59.6 
Greece 24.3 13.4 110 62.4 61.2 
Italy 24.4 13.8 78 60.4 60.9 
Spain 19.6 8.7 85 61.1 63.4 
S.E. Average 22.8 12.0 94 61.3 61.8 
Canada 17.8 5.3 57 63.3 61.4 
Ireland 13.8 3.2 39 65.2 64.7 
New Zealand 18.5 4.9 42 65.8 63.9 
UK 21.8 8.3 41 63.2 61.4 
US iv 14.8 6.1 52 64.5 63.1 
Liberal Average 17.3 5.5 46 64.4 62.9 
Notes:    Averages are shown for the four welfare regime types based on the countries shown in the table: 
Social Democratic (S.D.), Continental European (C.E.), Southern European (S.E.), and Liberal 
countries. Following the usual practice cluster averages are unweighted. 
i: Total public social expenditure is the provision by public institutions of benefits to, and 
financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during 
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and 
financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an 
individual contract or transfer. 
ii: Public pension expenditure comprises all cash expenditures on old-age pensions within the 
public sphere. 
iii: The net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net 
pre-retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions 
paid by workers and pensioners. The wedge between gross and net replacement rates varies 
substantially across countries. 
iv: Total public social expenditure and public pension expenditure for the US refer to federal 
expenditures. 
Sources: OECD 2007a; OECD 2007b; OECD 2007c. 
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Increasing health costs for an ageing society and quality of health care have become 
major policy concerns in Canada and the United Kingdom. Pension eligibility has been 
tightened and benefits have been reduced in the United States. In Canada, the 
contribution rates to public pensions were increased. We conclude that in the Liberal 
group re-commodification, or increasing the individual’s dependence on the market for 
old-age security, constitutes the main goal of recent pension reforms, while cost 
containment is another significant goal.  
3.2.2. The Social Democratic Regime 
In the welfare states of the Social Democratic regime (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden), the state plays a larger role than the market and the family in meeting its 
citizens’ social needs. State-centered welfare provisions lessen the individual’s reliance 
on the family and maximize individual command of economic resources independent of 
familial reciprocities (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). Welfare state provisions, therefore, 
make it easier for women to enter the labour market and to achieve economic 
independence. This regime also aims to harmonize women’s employment with 
childbearing (ibid.: 27). In part because of family-friendly institutional arrangements, the 
Scandinavian countries have higher fertility than other European countries, and thus 
population ageing is slightly less than elsewhere. Labour force participation is relatively 
high, as is age at retirement, partly as a function of active labour market programs and 
life-long learning provisions. The official age at retirement is also relatively high, and the 
net replacement rate of pension entitlements represents 73 percent of average former 
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earnings (Table 3.4). Total public spending is 26.7 percent of GDP, but this spending is 
not concentrated in pensions to the degree it is in Continental and Southern Europe.  
In the Social Democratic regime, individuals are less dependent on the market for 
old-age security, which is provided through universal and comprehensive welfare policies 
to which all income earners must contribute. The cost of maintaining a universalistic 
social support system is met through revenue from registered employees (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 28). This regime is also committed to full employment and to allowing 
two-earner couples to reconcile their family and work responsibilities. It is more fully 
committed to gender equality than other welfare regimes.  
Even though some argue that Scandinavian countries are becoming the 
“frontrunners in Liberalization” (Andersen et al. 2007), pension reforms in this regime 
are more concerned about cost containment, with moderate recalibration and little re-
commodification (Pierson 2001; Vidlund 2006). The new pension system in Sweden, for 
example, is a combination of an earnings-based pension and a minimum guaranteed 
pension that seeks to minimize pension costs. Those pensions based on earnings have 
adopted defined contributions both for the pay-as-you-go component and for the pre-
funded component (OECD 2003a: 47). Cost containment is thus met through high labour 
force participation and defined-contribution approaches.  
The reform agenda of Social Democratic countries has focused on rationalizing 
programs, following on social and cultural changes and on global economic 
developments. These countries have been relatively successful in restoring their fiscal 
equilibrium over the medium term (Pierson 2001: 444). Their most pressing long-term 
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problem is reconciling the need for continuing cost containment with the maintenance of 
support for a strong welfare state. Social Democratic welfare states depend on successful 
economic performance and the allegiance of all stratums of society. 
Thus in the Social Democratic regime, the state has two main roles in managing 
social risks: first, “de-familialization” to provide individual freedom; second, “de-
commodification” to minimize individuals’ welfare dependence on the market (Esping-
Andersen 1999, 2002). This approach can be seen in the pension regimes of Scandinavian 
countries. The state provides generous pension plans and social security for its citizens 
and emphasizes high labour force participation and cost containment of pension 
obligations. 
3.2.3. The Continental European Regime 
The Continental European welfare regime (Austria, France, Germany, and Netherlands) 
reflects a highly conservative and corporatist tradition heavily influenced by religious 
institutions. The conservative tradition is seen in the emphasis on the preservation of 
status differentials. Corporatist elements include the institutionalization of rights attached 
to class and status rather than to citizenship (Esping-Andersen 1990). The social 
insurance system, for example, is differentiated by occupational groups; even 
unemployment benefits differ according to a recipient’s previous occupation. The 
Continental welfare regime is sometimes criticized as being paternalistic, hierarchical, 
and gender biased. Contrary to the Liberal welfare regime, the state plays a fairly active 
role in the management of social risks. The state is considered mainly as minimally 
interventionist, and the welfare provisions tend to uphold the stratification of society and 
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the patriarchal family structure (Pierson 2001: 96). This gives rise to a focus on the male 
workforce with high wages, strong job security, and high pension incomes combined with 
the family’s dependence on the breadwinner’s income (Esping-Andersen 1996: 18). Men 
have higher employment opportunities in the form of full life-time employment and an 
entitlement to generous pension and unemployment rights. Relatively high wages and a 
long unbroken career for males provide support for the moderate familialistic character of 
the regime.  
While not as extensive as in Southern Europe, population ageing is significant in 
Continental Europe, with some countries anticipating population decline, and there are 
relatively low overall labour force participation rates and a young age at retirement. 
Countries in this regime cluster have a combination of generous pension schemes defined 
by occupation or by civil service membership. Relatively high replacement rates and 
diverse pension plans made early retirement popular. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Continental regime countries opted to use an early retirement strategy to address the 
problem of increasing unemployment. In Germany, for example, with the introduction of 
an early retirement option in 1973, the average retirement age declined from 62.2 years in 
1973 to 58.4 years in 1981 (OECD 2005d: 73). This trend toward early retirement has 
been reversed by reforms in the 1990s and 2000s seeking to extend people’s working 
lives (OECD 2005c). In Austria, the early retirement age was increased by 1.5 years, and 
pension ages for women were aligned with those of men (OECD 2007b: 102). After 
pension reform in Germany, some reductions in benefits were imposed on workers who 
retired before age 65. In France, however, one can retire at age 60 after 40 years’ 
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coverage without any reduction in benefits (OECD 2005c). Overall, there are fewer 
regulations regarding retirement age than in Southern European countries.  
The main goal of pension reforms in Continental European countries is to 
minimize financial costs in an ageing population through adjusting contribution rates and 
pension benefits. France, for example, changed to using the 25 highest income years of a 
person’s work life, instead of the ten highest years, in the calculation of pension benefits 
(OECD 2007b). Austria is gradually extending its benefits-averaging period from the 15 
highest to the 40 highest income years. In the Netherlands, the calculation of pension 
benefits in many occupational plans is shifting from final salary to average lifetime salary 
(OECD 2007b: 55). These conservative welfare states face significant problems 
associated with high unemployment rates, low economic growth rates, low levels of 
female work force participation, relatively low fertility rates, and high pension 
expenditures. According to Pierson (2001), reforms have centered especially on cost 
containment and recalibration of welfare policies to meet these challenges. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of a new private pension tier in Continental Europe is a clear example of 
increasing the individual’s dependence on the market (re-commodification). Hence, the 
role of state and family in managing social risks for the elderly population is shared by 
the market.  
Employment-linked social security, which protects life-long employment in these 
conservative countries, is one of the main characteristics of the Continental European 
welfare regime. Thus, there is strong social opposition to changes in employment 
structures and to reneging on the promise of full employment (Pierson 2001; Natali and 
Rhodes 2004). The situation in this regime cluster differs from that of the Liberal and 
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Social Democratic welfare states, where there is less recognition of specific class 
interests, especially those associated with the middle class (Korpi and Palme 2003).  
3.2.4. The Southern European Regime  
The Southern European welfare regime (Greece, Italy, and Spain) may be seen as a 
variant of the Continental regime because of its adherence to traditional familial welfare 
responsibilities. However, the socio-political structure of the Southern European 
countries differs from that of the Continental countries. Southern Europe has a distinctive 
type of welfare regime with features of universal national services in the health area and 
income transfers in other areas (Ferrera 1996). Moreover, the persistence of patronage in 
politics brings frequent changes to pension policies as political responses from the party 
in power. Unpaid family labour is common for women, providing child care, elder care, 
health care, and other services that the market provides in the Liberal regime. Women are 
entitled to benefits and access to social services through their husband’s or father’s social 
security coverage (Trifiletti 1999: 53). At the same time, women’s participation in the 
labour market, particularly in the paid service sector, has increased in recent decades, 
bringing changes to family structures. Financing of the social security system is 
dominated by contribution-based social insurance schemes, differentiated by occupation, 
as in the Continental welfare regime. Only registered workers and their dependents (in 
contrast to employees in small firms and the self employed) have access to pensions, 
health coverage, and social security. A basic means-tested plan provides these social 
benefits to the disadvantaged segments of the population. Unlike the Social Democratic 
and Continental regimes, only irregular and weak protections are available to workers.  
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The Southern European countries are characterized by having, on average, the 
oldest populations in our four groups, along with low labour force participation at ages 
55–64, especially for women. The family was once the most important pillar in managing 
social risks in the Southern European countries, but this pillar has lost its strength. The 
significant decline in fertility rates presents new social and economic challenges. Public 
spending as a percentage of GDP is relatively low, and half of this spending is for 
pensions. As in the Social Democratic and Continental welfare regimes, net replacement 
rates for pensions are high, at an average of 94 percent of former earnings for those 
retirees who have access to public pensions (Table 3.4).  
Pension plans in the Southern European countries can be seen as a less developed 
form of the Continental European model. Social security institutions were established late 
in the twentieth century, in contrast to their earlier introduction in the Continental and 
Social Democratic regimes. The lack of institutionalized social security structures, and 
the presence of political systems based on patronage, produce instability in public 
pension policies. While attempts have been made to strengthen social security 
institutions, some pension plans are being privatized in the face of budget deficits (OECD 
2003b, 2004a; Natali and Rhodes 2004). The move toward re-commodification is not as 
strong as in the Liberal countries, but it still represents an important aspect of pension 
reform agendas in Southern Europe.  
The early retirement option in pension plans is another factor that reduces the 
labour force participation of older workers in Southern European countries. The pension 
eligibility age in this group is among the youngest in OECD countries. As in the 
Continental European countries, early retirement had been used during the 1980s and 
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1990s to attempt to lower high unemployment rates among the young. Turkey, for 
instance, which shows features similar to the Southern European cluster, eliminated the 
minimum retirement age and permitted retirement in some cases after less than 15 years 
of pension contributions. This led to persons retiring early and then joining the informal 
sector while receiving their pension (Brook and Whitehouse 2006).  
In the Southern European regime, the reforms of the 1990s and 2000s aimed to 
secure financial sustainability by increasing the retirement age and implementing a 
supplementary private pension scheme. Pension reforms in Southern Europe cover all 
three of the Pierson categories: cost containment, recalibration, and re-commodification. 
Recalibration is especially important in achieving welfare goals, given that the welfare 
regime is less developed. In the reform agenda of these countries, improving the 
effectiveness of pension programs is required to cope with widespread benefit abuse and 
patronage, which threaten the future stability of welfare institutions. Raising pension 
eligibility ages is the first reform undertaken both to improve financial sustainability and 
cost containment and to rationalize a pension system under which life expectancy has 
been increasing over time. Hence, raising the age at eligibility became the most common 
feature of pension reforms in Southern European countries. In Italy, the normal pension 
age for women was increased from 55 to 60 years and for men from 60 to 65 in 2004. 
The early pension age for men with 35 years’ coverage increased from 60 to 62. In 
Greece, the pension age increased from 58 to 65 after the 1990–92 reforms. In 2002, 
Spain’s parliament passed a law penalizing early retirement. According to the new 
system, workers can retire at age 61 but their pension would be 24 to 30 percent lower 
than the full pension available at age 65 (OECD 2003b: 10).  
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The 1995 Dini Reform in Italy improved long-term fiscal sustainability of 
pensions by changing the benefit scheme from defined-benefit to defined contribution. In 
all countries in the Southern European regime cluster, reforms favoured private pension 
plans. Today, the pension system in Italy is a combination of compulsory pay-as-you-go 
and private pension systems (OECD 2004a: 66). In Spain, tax advantages were given to 
private pension schemes through the Toledo Pact of 1995. Similar regulations were 
introduced in Italy and Greece in the 1990s and 2000s. In spite of tax incentives, private 
pension plans are still in their infancy. In Spain, for instance, private pensions cover only 
3 to 5 percent of total employment (OECD 2003b: 67). 
3.3. Discussion: No Universal Public Policy for Ageing 
Discussion of pension reform is overly focused on public finances (Esping Andersen and 
Myles 2006). To facilitate the sustainability of pension systems, many analysts propose a 
combination of contribution increases, benefit cuts, increases in retirement age, and 
increases in the contribution period needed to qualify for full pensions. Intergenerational 
social justice, however, is largely overlooked in these discussions. In effect, poverty rates 
among the elderly have declined in most OECD countries, and the share of elderly among 
the poor has also been reduced (OECD 2000: 56). The recent global economic downturn 
particularly affects young people entering the labour market, rather than retirees who 
have the benefit of guaranteed payments without increases in premiums. The economic 
recession reduces the availability of well-paid standard jobs for labour force entrants. 
According to the OECD, by the end of 2009 the unemployment rate is expected to be 2.0-
2.5 percentage points higher than at the end of 2007. Especially in the United States and 
Canada, the unemployment rate has increased about 3.0-4.0 percentage points since the 
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economic recession began. Older people who had invested in private retirement plans lost 
some of their savings, but the most significant impact will be on the younger generation, 
especially in non-standard service-sector jobs.  
These different vantage points according to generation are triggering debates 
between workers, who are contributing to the pension system, and retirees, who are 
benefiting from past contributions to the system. Phillipson (2000) argues that this 
conflict can lead to a change in the perception of ageing from being a public/life-course 
issue to being a private/life-stage problem. Even though ageing becomes a private 
problem for an individual with a private pension plan, it also becomes a social and 
political problem when dealing, for example, with the need for pension reform. That is, 
the approaches to pensions and social security are linked with the demographic dynamics 
of particular countries. All countries face ageing populations, but countries in the Social 
Democratic regime cluster have shown greater ability to influence the level of 
childbearing (McDonald 2006), along with an interest in maximizing labour force 
participation of men and women to pay for generous social benefits. The Liberal regime 
is based on greater privatization. (It also allows for greater reliance on immigration to 
deal with demographic problems of a slower-growing labour force.) With their 
differential treatment of different groups in society, the Continental and the Southern 
European regimes have the most difficulty in achieving reforms, and they also face the 
highest rates of population ageing. While the market plays a significant role in the 
retirement and pension systems in the Liberal group, the state remains the key actor in the 
Social Democratic group. In other European countries, however, the family (especially in 
Southern Europe) still plays decisive roles in caring for the elderly. In spite of these 
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differences, there are important uniformities across regimes, which include attempts to 
delay retirement, to convert pensions to defined-contribution plans, and to have a higher 
dependence on private plans, all in the interest of seeking to achieve sustainability.  
This chapter shows that different welfare regimes have developed their own 
approaches to public pension reform. The Liberal welfare regime countries focus on cost 
containment and re-commodification; the Social Democratic countries on cost 
containment and recalibration; the Continental and Southern European countries on cost 
containment, recalibration, and re-commodification—each depending on their 
endogenous structures and traditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE WELFARE OF THE OLD: THE TURKISH WELFARE 
REGIME AND TURKISH PENSION POLICIES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
As populations get older, the costs of welfare provisions pose serious challenges to 
societies (OECD 1998). There has been significant debate on pension systems based on 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes since the 1980s. Pension policies have been particularly 
discussed and studied in Europe and North America (OECD 2000; Pierson et al. 2001; 
Esping-Andersen and Myles 2006; Arza and Kohli et al. 2008). There are, however, few 
studies analyzing welfare of the elderly and pension systems in newly industrializing and 
recently ageing countries. In addition, welfare regimes of these countries and their 
responses to challenges of population ageing and pension systems are generally 
overlooked in the study of the welfare state literature.  
At this point, Turkey is an interesting example, with its rapid economic growth in 
the 2000s, European Union (EU) candidacy, an increasing political role in the Middle 
East, and young population. Contrary to many welfare regimes in Europe, there are few 
studies on the Turkish welfare regime. However, the Turkish welfare regime has 
encountered significant changes due to the changes in the family, the state, and the 
market (Bugra and Keyder 2006). These changes have brought to the research agenda 
important questions regarding the Turkish welfare regime. This study seeks to answer the 
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following questions. What are the roles of the family, the market, and local actors in the 
management of social risks? Are public pension policies based on one’s employment 
history adequate for the social security of the old citizens? Do we witness a neo-liberal 
economic process in Turkish pension policies?  
Hence, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it aims to highlight important 
characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies. That is, it seeks to 
examine how the welfare regime has evolved in view of actors representing the interests 
of state, market, family, and local actors. Second, it aims to analyze the ways in which 
the Turkish welfare regime and its pension policies are affecting the welfare of the old 
across gender and generations. That is, it seeks to analyze how the pension system and its 
transformation are affecting equity across various groups, including elements that are 
progressive and regressive. 
Having established the main purposes of the chapter, the analysis will be done as 
follows. The first purpose involves evaluating the analyses of other researchers and using 
comparative data from the Turkish Statistics Institute (TURKSTAT) and the 
Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) in regards to 
socioeconomic changes in Turkey. The second purpose will be achieved through studying 
the pension reforms and the associated working documents, and analyzing the way in 
which the costs and benefits of the pension system have been distributed across 
population groups.  
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is two-fold. First, it highlights the 
main characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, which have been underrepresented in 
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the literature so far. Here the focus is on the roles of welfare actors— namely, the state, 
the market, the family, and local actors. Despite some studies on the Turkish welfare 
regime which focus on state policies (Boratav and Ozugurlu 2006; Bugra and Keyder 
2006), this chapter focuses on other welfare actors. Second, it studies the welfare of the 
old in Turkey using the welfare regime approach. While there are some studies focusing 
on the general characteristics of the social policies in Turkey (see for example, Bugra and 
Keyder 2003; Yakut-Cakar 2007) and others that focus on the economic impacts of the 
pension reforms (see for example, Brook and Whitehouse 2006; Elveren 2008b), this 
paper scrutinizes the welfare of the elderly and pension reforms in light of the welfare 
regime approach. 
This study claims that the Turkish welfare regime is undergoing significant 
transformations through the impact of internal and external dynamics. Contrary to what 
has been documented in other countries, it is difficult to argue that the Turkish welfare 
regime has transformed to a Liberal welfare regime dominated by market actors, or to a 
Social Democratic welfare regime based on a universalist and right-based system. While 
on the one hand, Turkey’s EU accession process, an ageing population, and increasing 
living standards induces the state to play a more active role in the welfare of the old, on 
the other hand, increasing social expenditures necessitate the state to collaborate with 
other actors, especially the market. This chapter will argue that while families are losing 
their dominance on welfare distribution, the state, the market, and local actors are 
strengthening their roles in the Turkish welfare regime. In order to understand the 
increasing role of the state and transformation of the Turkish welfare regime, the pension 
system and pension reforms are important. During the 2000s, there have been important 
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developments that have enabled a sustainable and fair pension system in Turkey. This 
research indicates that recalibration is the main target of the recent pension reforms. 
  This chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, the second section 
examines the Turkish welfare regime and its actors. This section discusses how welfare is 
distributed through the family, the market, the state, and local actors. The third section 
analyses the welfare of the old with particular focus on pension policies and pension 
reforms. Also, this section discusses the problems of pension policies in terms of gender 
and intergenerational equity. Finally, in the last section, policy recommendations for a 
better pension system will be briefly discussed in light of the Turkish welfare regime. 
4.2. Highlighting the General Characteristics of the Turkish Welfare Regime 
Traditional analyses of the welfare state focusing on public expenditure are inadequate to 
examine the welfare distribution in contemporary societies (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2-3). 
Contrary to the concept of the welfare state, which is narrowly associated with state 
expenditures, the term welfare regime focuses on not only state expenditures, but also the 
market, the family, and local actors in welfare distribution. Hence, centering on societies 
and social actors helps researchers to better understand the welfare mix of the newly 
industrializing countries and allows for a deeper cross-national comparative analysis. 
There are four major actors—the state, the family, the market, and local actors—
in welfare distribution, and these actors are important in classifying societies according to 
welfare regimes. For example, while the market is an important player in the Liberal 
welfare regime as is the case in the US and Canada, in the Social Democratic welfare 
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regime (e.g., in Denmark and Sweden) the state is the main player. Similar to the 
Southern European welfare regime, the family and local actors play a significant role in 
the Turkish welfare regime.  
In welfare regime groupings, some comparative studies include Turkey in the 
Southern European welfare regime (Gough 1996; Bugra and Keyder 2006; Yakut-Cakar 
2007; Gal 2010; Aysan 2011). There is also a small body of research that assigns Turkey 
to a “Middle Eastern” group. In these studies, it is argued that the state has a relatively 
limited role in welfare distribution and that religion is an important determinant in the 
formation of social policies (Karshenas and Moghadam et al. 2006; Jawad and Yakut-
Cakar 2010). Others report that the Turkish welfare regime is a combination of the 
Southern European and Middle Eastern welfare groups (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010).2 It 
seems that we need a more cross-national approach in order to better understand the 
similarities and differences between the Turkish welfare regime and other welfare 
regimes. 
The Turkish welfare regime has undergone significant changes in respects to the 
family, the state, and the market (Bugra and Keyder 2006). On the one hand, social and 
economic criteria for EU accession have prompted the Turkish state to play an active role 
in welfare distribution. On the other hand, privatization processes defended by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) lead 
                                               
2 It seems that it is difficult to construct a welfare group that contains all Middle Eastern countries. 
Although they have similar religious and cultural features (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010), oil-rich gulf 
countries diverge from other countries in the region because of their natural resources and relatively strong 
state involvement in the welfare distribution. 
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markets to play an important role in the distribution of welfare in Turkey. Changes in 
family structure and increases in the labour force participation of young and educated 
women lead the family to lose its dominant role in welfare distribution in this regime. At 
the same time, globalization and localization trends enhance the role of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors in the management of social risks. 
In light of aforementioned trends, the main characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime 
can be summarized as follows:   
1) Welfare is distributed through a family-centered patriarchal structure (Bugra 
and Keyder 2006; Gal 2010; Aysan 2011).  
2) Based on traditional and religious values, local actors, such as kinship or home 
township groups and other religious non-profit organizations, play a significant 
role in welfare distribution (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010, Gal 2010).  
3) The market has a relatively minor but increasing role in welfare distribution. 
4) The state has a moderate role in welfare distribution, except with regards to 
education and to some extent health care. Also, populism and patronage are two 
important welfare distribution forms used by governments. 
4.2.1. The Family 
The World Values Survey (2011) indicates that Turkey has one of the highest scores on 
importance of marriage and family, along with Italy and Egypt (see Figure 4.A.1 and 
Figure 4.A.2). According to this survey, 95 percent of Turks, which is the highest 
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percentage among OECD countries, think that marriage is not outdated. Among the 
different types of relationship status, “divorced” is the least common, at only 1 percent, 
while the OECD average is 4 percent (OECD 2011b). Although Turkey has a relatively 
stable family formation compared to other OECD countries, there are significant changes 
in family formation and gender roles due to social and economic challenges. For 
example, Aytac and Rankin (2009) show that contrary to previous research, economic 
difficulties in the family have a direct impact on marital problems and an indirect impact 
on women via emotional distress. The significant increase in crude divorce rates over the 
period 1970-2008 also shows the challenges to Turkish families. While the crude divorce 
rate was 0.3 per thousand in 1970, it increased to 1.4 per thousand in 2008 (OECD 
2011c). 
In this regime, welfare is distributed based on the gendered division of labour in 
the family. While men are responsible for meeting the economic needs of the household, 
women are responsible for unpaid domestic labour, such as caring and housekeeping. Not 
only child care, but also elder care is provided by women in this welfare regime. As 
Table 4.1 presents, Turkish women do more unpaid house work than other women in 
OECD countries with 377 minutes per day. Also, in other Southern European countries, 
such as in Italy and Portugal, women spend more time on unpaid work than men. Women 
from the Liberal and Continental European countries spend relatively less time on unpaid 
housework (e.g. US with 258 minutes and Germany with 269 minutes) when compared 
with women from the Southern European countries. As Table 4.1 shows, the 
Scandinavian countries with the smallest gender gap in unpaid work are also those 
countries where men devote relatively more time to unpaid work. While Turkish and 
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Portuguese women spend 4 hours more per day on unpaid work than men, the difference 
between genders is only around an hour per day in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. 
Norway with 225 minutes). 
Table 4.1.  
Unpaid Work by Gender across OECD over the period 1998-2009, 
in minutes per day 
 Female unpaid work 
Male 
unpaid 
work 
Difference 
between genders 
Turkey 377 116 260 
Portugal 328 96 232 
Italy 326 103 223 
Spain 294 107 187 
    
Australia 311 172 139 
Ireland 296 129 167 
New Zealand 294 158 136 
United Kingdom 273 150 123 
United States 258 154 104 
Canada 248 146 102 
    
Netherlands 273 163 110 
Austria 269 135 134 
Germany 269 164 105 
France 258 136 122 
    
Sweden 249 177 72 
Finland 245 154 91 
Denmark 243 186 57 
Norway 225 152 73 
    
OECD Average 279 131 148 
Source: Miranda 2011, Figure 5, pp. 13. 
The family is the prominent actor in the management of social risks in Southern 
European and Middle Eastern societies, and Turkey. The Southern European welfare 
regime is characterized by a preference for family solutions to welfare problems (Ferrera 
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1996; Mingione 2001; Gal 2010). In this regime, the family is considered as an 
alternative to state institutions for people—in other words, they rely on either their 
families, some extended forms of kinship, or other social networks (Mingione 2001; 
Saraceno 2002). 
In a subsequent section (section 4.3) it will be documented that, in Turkey, young 
adults usually live with their parents until they get married, while many seniors reside 
with their children when they become very old or disabled. The welfare distribution is 
heavily based on informal strategies of household income maintenance (Grutjen 2008). 
This is particularly common in urban areas where an extended family type is a standard. 
As is the case in the Southern European welfare regime, seniors contribute to the income 
of the household through their pensions and other incomes (Albertini et al. 2007).  
In Turkey, the family receives little public support in the form of child benefits 
and family allowances. Paid maternal leave is very low (with 16 weeks) when compared 
to other OECD countries, such as 52 weeks in UK. Paternal leave is also low in Turkey. 
What is most disconcerting, however, is paternal leave has a duration of only three days 
in length and is only available to civil servants. A lack of affordable high quality social 
services for children and seniors in the market, and a lack of state support with regards to 
family care, both contribute to increase the burden of women in Turkey. This problem 
mainly leads women’s labour force participation to remain very low in the Southern 
European countries and Turkey compared to other OECD countries. For example, in 
2009 the labour force participation for women was 77.8 percent in Sweden, 75.7 percent 
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in Canada, and 71.3 percent in Germany, whereas it was only 57.2 percent in Greece, 
51.6 percent in Italy, and 29.1 percent in Turkey (OECD 2011a). 
Increasing education levels, employment rates, and societal expectations for 
women to preserve their traditional caring roles as homemakers, converge and create a 
double burden for women (Hochschild and Machung 2003). It is in this regard that the 
adult generations, especially those of women, become what is referred to as a “sandwich 
generation” – a generation captured by responsibilities for their children and their 
parents. The impacts of work-family conflict on fertility could have been partially 
mitigated with the help of institutional arrangements, such as paternal leaves, childcare 
benefits, and tax benefits as in many Scandinavian countries (Gauthier 1996). Also, 
institutional arrangements that help women to balance work and family are inadequate in 
Turkey as well as in the Southern European countries and Japan (Boling 2008; McDonald 
2006). The low total fertility rate in these countries is one of the outcomes of limited 
public support for families. The fertility rates in Turkey, for example, declined 
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. While the total fertility rate was 5.00 in 1970, it 
declined to below replacement level with 2.06 in 2009 (TURKSTAT 2011).  
Even though the labour force participation of women is relatively lower in Turkey 
when compared to other OECD countries, labour force participation has increased 
significantly among educated young women in urban areas (Aysan 2008). According to 
TURKSTAT (2011), the number of employed women who have a university degree 
increased about four times between 1990 and 2010. The increase in the labour force 
participation rates for women in urban Turkey also evidences this trend. As Table 4.2 
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shows, while the labour force participation rate for women had increased in all age 
groups, it fell for men in all age groups between 1990 and 2010. The increase in the 
labour force participation rates for women was especially significant in younger age 
groups (20-24 and 25-29). In these age groups, women have about half of men’s labour 
force participation, while in other age groups the labour force participation gap is 4 or 5 
times greater.    
Table 4.2. 
Urban Labour Force Participation by Age and Gender, Turkey, 1990-2010 
Men 
  
20-
24  
25-
29  
30-
34  
35-
39  
40-
44  
45-
49  
50-
54  
55-
59  
60-
64  65+  Total 
1990 84.7 97.4 98.4 98.3 95.6 87.7 66.9 49.8 32.9 16.2 79.7 
1995 76.1 95.9 98.1 98.3 94.7 83.1 69.3 50.7 34.6 17.0 77.8 
2000 66.0 91.5 95.9 96.1 92.9 79.1 58.8 43.0 27.9 14.0 73.7 
2005 71.9 94.1 96.2 96.2 93.8 79.5 58.4 41.5 24.8 11.9 70.6 
2010 70.1 93.1 96.5 96.4 94.4 83.5 60.6 41.1 27.6 10.7 70.8 
Women 
1990 25.3 20.7 21.8 22.4 18.5 10.7 6.5 4.3 3.0 0.9 34.2 
1995 24.4 22.3 21.3 20.5 17.8 12.1 7.5 5.0 3.2 2.5 30.9 
2000 25.6 24.9 21.9 20.6 17.6 11.1 8.0 4.5 2.5 1.4 26.6 
2005 29.5 29.5 24.3 24.8 20.2 14.9 9.4 6.0 3.5 1.7 23.3 
2010 35.1 36.9 33.1 33.3 30.4 20.0 12.9 7.8 4.0 1.5 27.6 
Note: Total Labour force participation is for the whole population including rural population. 
Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the percentage of women in various sectors and total employment 
between 1990 and 2010. In 1990, 75 percent of women worked in agriculture, 14.7 in the 
service sector, and 9.8 in industry. In 2010, although the number of employed women 
was still the highest in agriculture, the number of employed women in the service and 
industry sectors tripled and doubled, respectively, within two decades. While the 
percentage of employed women in agriculture fell to 42.4 percent, the percentages 
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increased to 15.9 in industry, and 41.7 in services. However, in spite of significant 
increases in the service and industry sectors during the period 1990-2010, the total 
number of employed women increased only about half a million due to a decline in the 
agricultural employment of women.3 
Table 4.3.  
Distribution of Women by Various Economic Sectors, Turkey, 1990-2010 i 
 
Agriculture Industry ii Services iii Total 
  
Total 
Number % 
Total 
Number % 
Total 
Number % 
Total 
Number % 
1990  4,428  75.0 576  9.8 868  14.7 5,902  100.0 
1995  4,255  71.2 572  9.6 1,148  19.2 5,976  100.0 
2000  3,508  60.5 763  13.2 1,529  26.4 5,800  100.0 
2005  2,367  46.3 850  16.6 1,892  37.0 5,108  100.0 
2010  2,724  42.4 1,022  15.9 2,680  41.7 6,425  100.0 
Notes: i) Thousand person, age 15 and over.  
ii) Industry as the sum of manufacturing, mining, quarrying, electricity, gas, and water, construction 
sectors. 
iii) Service as the sum of finance, business, retail, real estate, social services, transportation, and 
restaurant. 
Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr. 
Significant increases in young women’s labour force participation in urban areas as well 
as the continuation of traditional gender roles in society pose important threats not only to 
women but also to families. Due to changes in family formation and the increase in 
                                               
3 The fact is that lack of job opportunities in service or industry sectors for unskilled agricultural workers 
who migrated to urban areas led to a decrease in labour force participation rates recently (see Table 4.2). 
This is also valid for women. Women, working as a family worker in agriculture and doing domestic work 
at home, are considered as employed according to TURKSTAT. When they migrate to urban areas, they 
become homemakers due to the lack of work opportunities outside of the home for these unskilled women. 
Traditional values that consider women’s work outside of the home inappropriate also affect women’s 
labour force participation. However, increase in the number of educated women has positively affected 
women’s labour force participation since the 1980s.  
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labour force participation among young women who are responsible for caring in the 
family, families are losing their main role in the distribution of welfare. The importance 
of the family in social welfare and challenges to its traditional roles are key matters in the 
transformation of the Turkish welfare regime.  
4.2.2. Local Actors and NGOs 
In addition to the family, another important player in the Turkish welfare regime is local 
actors. These institutions can be shaped by a particular religious or political group as well 
as by people who migrated from the same rural regions. The influence of religion and 
religious values is especially significant in the formation of social welfare in Turkey as 
well as in the Middle East (Jawad and Cakar 2010). Therefore, the Turkish welfare 
regime cannot be understood without analyzing Islamic tradition. For Muslim dominated 
countries and the Ottoman State (the predecessor of today’s Turkey), Islam was the main 
determinant of the charitable activities in society and social policies of the state. Zakat 
(obligatory alms) and sadaka (alms) have noteworthy roles to reduce inequality and to 
provide the basic needs of the poor. Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, is the giving of 
2.5 percent of one’s surplus wealth every year to the poor and needy. In Islamic history, 
apart from zakat and sadaka, various forms of assistance for the poor and the needy were 
carried through charitable foundations. Since these assistances—zakat and sadaka—are 
generally not documented officially, it is difficult to estimate the amount of assistance 
given to people in need. However, the religious orientation of the population encourages 
high charitable contributions.  
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Traditional foundations, Vakıfs, are major institutions shaped by Islamic 
jurisprudence to manage basic social risks within a community and to improve the living 
standards of people. Vakıf, as a religious institution, has a long history which goes back to 
the 11th century in Turkey (Directorate General of Foundations 2011). It is an institution 
which devotes its profits to charitable activities for good deeds. Compared to European 
and American counterparts, these institutions are slightly different due to the organization 
and functions of vakıfs. In many regions of Turkey and territories ruled by the Ottoman 
State, where the state could not meet the basic needs of people, vakıfs undertook social 
responsibilities. Their services extend into the areas of education, health, shelter, 
infrastructure, and religion. Even though many Ottoman vakıfs have disappeared, there 
are still many vakıfs heavily influenced by religious and traditional values which have 
continued to provide social services not only for Turkish citizens but also for other needy 
people outside of the country.  
Especially since the 1980s, the state encourages NGOs and private companies to 
participate in social welfare projects. The Law number 5253 on associations which 
passed in 2004 improved the legal status of NGOs. This law allowed NGOs to constitute 
their own social welfare projects with limited government controls. The state has also 
tried to encourage private firms and companies to finance social projects. The Marmara 
Earthquake in 1999 prompted in the development of NGOs, and especially non-profit 
organizations. Inadequate state involvement in relieving the problems of people affected 
by the earthquake, and significant success of non-profit organizations in the earthquake 
region, helped these organizations to become popular and trustworthy in Turkish society. 
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In 2011, around 10 percent of the population was a member of an association and 
there were about 87,700 associations and 46,000 vakıfs in Turkey (Department of 
Associations 2011). There are two major associations—charity associations and 
hometown associations—in welfare distribution. Charity associations, which compose 
about 20 percent of all associations, are established to solve various social problems such 
as poverty, hunger, shelter, and education. Hometown associations, which compose about 
18 percent of all associations, are established to create solidarity for fellow countrymen in 
the cities (Department of Associations 2011). Contrary to charity associations, they are 
established to achieve group solidarity and they can operate a political lobby in the cities. 
The high rate of charity associations and hometown associations, when compared with all 
other associations, indicates how these associations occupy an important role in welfare 
distribution.  
Among these organizations, faith-based charity organizations have significant 
success in dealing with social needs (Bugra 2007; Gal 2010). For example, Deniz Feneri 
(the Lighthouse), Kimse Yok mu? (Is anybody there?), and IHH (the Foundation for 
Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) are some of the biggest faith-
based charity organizations which have social services and aid programs ranging from 
Haiti to Africa. For example, the Lighthouse association spent about US$ 45 million cash 
and in kind for social welfare activities in 2010 (Lighthouse 2011). Since 1989, tax 
deduction incentives for both public benefit associations and foundations have 
encouraged people to donate to these non-profit organizations. In 2011, there were 474 
public charitable associations and 222 foundations registered as public benefit 
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association, and  donors can apply for tax exemption up to 5 percent of their annual 
income, if they donate specially to these organizations (TUSEV 2011). 
4.2.3. The Market  
The third actor in welfare distribution is the market. Due to the minimal and residual role 
of the state, in some welfare regimes such as US and UK, the market plays a significant 
role in the management of the social risks. In Turkey, however, due to the strong statist 
economic policies, the market did not have a significant role in any aspect of social life, 
especially in welfare distribution, until the 1980s. With the implementation of export-
oriented industrialization and neo-liberal policies, the private sector started to flourish 
after the 1980s (Boratav 2005). Parallel to neo-liberal trends in the world, the new 
economic policies led to privatization of state-owned enterprises, subcontracting, and 
flexibilization of labour markets. There were two main consequences with regard to 
welfare distribution. First, the state gradually withdrew from its important welfare role—
as an employer and provider—through privatization of state-owned enterprises. Second, 
neo-liberalism led private entrepreneurs to invest in various sectors which have 
traditionally been provided by the state, such as health care and education. These trends 
brought new challenges to workers who work in relatively secure and well-paid jobs in 
the public as well as private sector. The result was evident, while the export increased 
about 5.5 times from $1.7 million to $11 million, average real wages declined 
approximately 34 percent over the period 1977-1987 (TURKSTAT 2011). 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the market started to play a more active role in 
welfare distribution in Turkey. For instance, while the number of primary and secondary 
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school students in public schools increased about 16 percent from 11.4 million to 13.3 
million, the number of students in private schools increased 370 percent from 106 
thousand to 396 thousand over the period 1992-2010. Various reforms during the 2000s 
increased the number of social services provided by the market. For example, the heath 
care reform, Law no. 5502 on Universal Health Insurance was enacted in 2006. This law, 
which accompanies Law no. 5510 on Social Security and Universal Health Insurance, 
aimed to unify health services of different occupation-based social security institutions 
(ES, SSK, and Bağ-Kur). The new law not only brings uniformity to health care services, 
but also presents different choices to the patients. Those who have social security 
coverage from any of three social security institutions can choose to receive heath care 
services from private hospitals. Patients need to pay extra charges beyond the average 
prices of health service limits set by the Social Security Institution. The reform had a 
significant effect on the expansion of private hospitals in health care. Between 2002 and 
2008, while the number of public hospitals increased about 10 percent from 824 to 904, 
the number of private hospitals increased about 48 percent from 270 to 400 (Ministry of 
Health 2010). Also, the number of private hospital visits significantly increase in the 
same period. While the number of hospital visits increased about two times in average, 
the number of hospital visits increased 7 times for private hospitals (Ministry of Health 
2010).   
Another reform of social services enacted in 2005 increased the number of private 
social service providers in various areas, such as rehabilitation, disability, elderly care. 
Parallel to health care services, costs of the private social services are covered by the state 
for those who cannot afford to pay costs of the services. The number of people who 
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choose private social services providers is expected to increase about 65 percent from 
19,600 to 32,240 over the period 2009-2014. 
However, it is difficult to agree with Yakut-Cakar (2007) who claims the 
privatization of health care services deepened social inequalities. For example, after the 
reform, these benefits of the Green Card system, which provides free health care services 
for the poor, were equalized with the benefits of other social security systems. Also, for 
the first time, free health services have been provided to children under the age of 18 
regardless of the social security coverage of their parents. In this regard, as discussed in 
the next section, rather than simply liberalizing social services, the state aims to 
collaborate with other welfare actors to provide efficient and high quality social services 
to mitigate the rising cost of an ageing population. 
4.2.4. The State 
4.2.4.1. The Turkish State: Moderate role 
The Turkish state has a paternalistic character inherited from the Ottoman state. The 
concept of the state as the “father” of the nation retains more than a symbolic value for 
Turkish people (Bugra 2004; Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). However, compared to oil-
rich countries in the Middle East, the Turkish state lacks natural and financial resources 
to distribute. Hence, the state has a moderate role in welfare distribution. This 
paternalistic mentality, based on the idea that state involvement in social welfare is a gift 
rather than a citizenship right, has been inherited from the Ottoman State (Bugra 2004). 
The Ottoman State had a regulatory role in the formation of welfare distribution rather 
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than as a direct actor. As highlighted, local actors, especially vakıfs, played an active role 
in meeting various needs.  
Similar to Turkey, the role of the state in welfare distribution is considered as 
“residual” in the Southern European and Middle Eastern countries. Social policies have 
nation-building and developmentalist objectives in Turkey, rather than being built on the 
idea of social citizenship rights and a welfare state (Boratav and Ozugurlu 2006; Aybars 
and Tsarouhas 2010: 749). While the state is motivated by a traditional paternalistic 
approach, the state is generally not seen as a key player in the distribution of welfare in 
the Southern European countries (Ferrera 1996) in Turkey (Bugra 2004).  
The statist (or etatist) approach, championing the role of the state in economic 
growth, was the main ideology of the Turkish Republic until the 1950s. The Turkish state 
continued to be the biggest employer in various economic sectors ranging from finance to 
mining until the 1980s (Boratav 2005). The state always had surplus workers in its 
factories and it purchased products from farmers to support the national economy and the 
labour market. In fact, significant state involvement in economic questions was a way of 
“indirect” welfare distribution which was exploited by political parties.   
Contrary to some European countries, social security services, such as health care, 
pension allowances, and family allowances were institutionalized later in Turkey. 
However, the corporatist character of the Continental European regime is shared by 
Turkey as well as the Southern European welfare regime. As will be discussed in the next 
section (section 4.3), the Turkish welfare regime is highly dependent on the membership 
of occupationally defined groups— namely, civil servants, workers and self employed 
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people. It is inegalitarian in nature, especially with regards to its exclusion of some 
groups from the formal labour market (see Table 4.6 for the number of insured people). 
Until the 1950s, social policies in Turkey were mostly concerned with protecting 
civil servants’ pension and health service entitlements. As will be mentioned below, due 
to the corporatist characteristic of the Turkish welfare regime, pension and health care 
services had been organized according to employees’ occupations until the 2006 social 
security reform. In this regard, similar to the Southern European welfare regime, the 
existence of universal health provision alongside a flourishing private health market, 
posed a seminal characteristic of the Turkish welfare regime.  
In spite of welfare reforms and economic developments, over 80 percent of 
people in Turkey, Italy, and Portugal think that benefits and economic gains were not 
distributed fairly (OECD 2008a: 15). This problem may be closely related to cultural and 
institutional reasons, such as the significant role of families in welfare distribution, high 
levels of tolerance to poverty and inequality, and particularly less state accountability 
(Bugra and Adar 2008; Ferreira 2008). Also, according to Ferrera (1996) and Gal (2010) 
ineffectiveness and fragmentation in the social security system result in significant 
economic and social gaps among different groups of society in these countries. In the 
Turkish case, the main social welfare roles of the state are considered to be education and 
to some extent health care. 
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4.2.4.2. Patronage and Populism: A Way of Welfare Distribution 
As indicated, the state plays a relatively limited role in terms of its ability to distribute 
welfare. There are, however, other ways which are considerably more crude and informal 
to distribute welfare in the society. This section asserts that although they are losing their 
importance in the welfare distribution, there are two main paths—patronage and 
populism—in the Turkish welfare regime. 
The terms patronage and clientalism are commonly used interchangeably.4 The 
term patronage refers to the use of state resources to reward particular groups such as 
partisans to get their electoral support (Piattoni 2001: 5). This patronage is closely related 
to clientalism, which is the distribution of resources in the public administration by 
political leaders (patrons) to their supporters (clients). In extreme circumstances, the term 
patronage refers to a type of corruption in which a political party in power illegally 
rewards its partisans for their political support. In this regard, patronage or clientelism is 
one of the conventional forms in which interests are represented and promoted— this 
constitutes a practical solution to the problem of democratic representation (Piattoni 
2001:18). Indeed, due to social and economic empowerment within various groups, 
clientalistic relationships in peasant societies and among recent migrants to the cities are 
common (Roniger 2004).  
                                               
4 According to Piattoni (2001), patronage has two meanings. First, it serves to point out the distribution of 
administrative positions to partisans to keep the “organic” structure between politicians and their electors. 
For example, in the British political tradition, the Prime Minister is allowed to appoint the ministers of the 
government who support the political party of the Prime Minister. Second, patronage is used to show the 
use of political power to distribute jobs, goods, and resources to partisans to strengthen position of the 
politician. 
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According to Ferrera (1996) and Gal (2010), patronage and clientelism in the 
Southern European countries are linked to historical commonalities—particularly those 
that are related to the process of political mobilisation and the establishment of state 
institutions in these countries. It seems in countries like Turkey, which experienced a 
rapid urbanization process and high rural-urban domestic migration, patronage is 
considered to be a general welfare distribution mechanism in return for political support 
in the elections. Clientalistic relations are strengthened by ongoing political tensions 
among political parties and ideologies as well as weak political institutions. For example, 
in the congress of his political party, a previous Minister of Interior could declare that he 
and his predecessor from the same party had collectively employed 3,000 judges who 
were affiliated with their party during their administrative terms. He also questioned: 
“Should I have appointed the members of rival political parties to these positions instead 
of my own party?” (Aksiyon 1995). 
Populism is the second informal welfare distribution mechanism applied by local 
and national administrations. Unlike patronage or clientelism, populism benefits the 
masses in the hopes of gaining the majority of voters. Therefore, contrary to the 
arguments of Aybars and Tsarouhas (2010), populism is different from patronage in the 
way it is practiced and in terms of the population it targets. For example, as pointed out in 
the next section, decreasing the official retirement age before an election is a type of 
populism which negatively impacts the long run sustainability of the pension system and 
public budget. Therefore, despite financial damages in the long term, politicians apply 
populist policies to gain a majority of electors’ votes for upcoming elections. 
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Another method of populist welfare distribution is accomplished by condoning 
the illegal construction of homes (squatter settlements or gecekondu in Turkish) on public 
land in the periphery of cities. The formation of squatter settlements denotes a process 
whereby lower income migrants from rural areas find informal solutions to their basic 
shelter needs within urban regulations (Saracgil 1999). Starting from the 1940s, squatter 
settlements began to emerge in big cities due to rapid internal migration and a lack of 
urban planning. According to Isik and Pinarcioglu (2001), in addition to local network 
relationships (relatives and people from the same hometown), local resettlement policies 
(or lack of resettlement policies for newcomers) helped new migrants to emancipate from 
poverty through squatter settlements in the periphery of cities. Local administrators had 
neither the power nor the intention to stop the illegal construction of squatter settlements 
(Saracgil 1999). Being potential electors, by the 2000s local administrators permitted new 
migrants to construct new squatter settlements by providing amnesty to squatters and as 
well as basic infrastructure services. Therefore, patronage and populism, which emerged 
in various forms, constitute two informal welfare distribution strategies used by the state 
in the Turkey.    
To sum up, the family is the main actor in the Turkish welfare regime, whereas 
gender is the key factor that determines roles of family members in welfare distribution. 
While men are responsible for meeting the economic needs of the household, women are 
responsible for unpaid domestic labour. However, traditional Turkish families have been 
challenged by socio-economic and cultural dynamics. These challenges not only 
influence traditional families but also the welfare regime in general and the welfare of the 
old in particular. In addition to families, local actors are important players in welfare 
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distribution. Hometown relations, NGOs, and vakıfs are some of the local actors that 
formally and informally distribute the welfare among social groups. Despite its increasing 
role through neo-liberal reforms, the market has a relatively minor role in welfare 
distribution. Compared to the Social Democratic countries, the Turkish state has a 
relatively moderate role in welfare distribution. Populism and patronage are two 
noteworthy strategies that governments use to distribute welfare.  
4.3. The Welfare of the Old and Pension Policies in Turkey 
Compared to other age groups, the state plays a more active role in the welfare of the old. 
Pension benefits are the central tool that helps the state to distribute welfare. Hence, this 
section will examine the welfare of the old particularly in light of the state and pension 
policies. 
Incomes of the elderly (aged 65 and over) are generally lower than those of the 
total population in OECD countries. According to OECD (2011b) estimations, on 
average people aged 65 and over had incomes that were about 83 percent of the whole 
population in the mid-2000s. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s while incomes 
of elderly increased faster than those of the whole population in many OECD countries, 
incomes of the elderly dropped about 13 percent in Turkey (OECD 2011b). With this 
decline in older people’s incomes between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s in Turkey, 
the old-age poverty rate5 was slightly higher at 15.1 percent compared to the OECD 
                                               
5 Poverty rates are defined by the OECD as the share of individuals with equivalised disposable income less 
than 40, 50 and 60 percent of the median for the entire population. 
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average of 13.5 percent in the mid-2000s (OECD 2011d). However, the poverty gap 
between Turkey and the OECD average is higher for the total population. In the same 
period, the poverty rate, on average, was 10.6 percent for the whole population in OECD, 
while it was 17.5 percent in Turkey. The poverty ratio of the elderly to the whole 
population was 1.27 in OECD, it was 0.86 in Turkey.  
4.3.1. The Welfare of the Old: The Family 
Parallel to its significant role in the management of different social risks over the 
lifecourse, the family is an important actor in handling social risks of seniors. As 
indicated before, child and senior care are among the main functions of families. In their 
cross-national research, Guerrero and Naldini (1996) show that despite the rapid family 
transformation, the Southern European societies have a high degree of cross-generational 
cohabitation compared to Scandinavian and Continental European countries. 
Comparative OECD data on family structure in the 2000s supports Guerrero and 
Naldini’s findings. According to the OECD (2011c), it is a common phenomenon to see 
different generations—children, parents, and grandparents—living in the same household 
in Turkey, as well as other Southern European countries. For the age group 20-34, 60 
percent of children live with their parents in Turkey, 52 percent in Spain, and 51 percent 
in Italy, but is only 25 percent in the UK, 24 percent in Germany, and 8 percent in 
Denmark (OECD 2011c). Also, in Turkey, extended families that consist of children, 
parents, and grandparents are very common, particularly in rural areas where earning and 
caring are shared by younger and older generations. According to TURKSTAT (2006a), 
while 10 percent of households were extended families in urban areas, it was 18 percent 
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in rural areas in 2006. OECD (2011b) data show the importance of family support and 
sharing the same household in the welfare of the Turkish elderly. In Turkey, households 
headed by a single person aged 65 and over have incomes of only about 48 percent of 
those households headed by someone of the same age group but composed of two or 
more adults (OECD 2011b: 147). 
Even if children and parents live in separate households, children care for their 
senior parents in hard times. In particular, when parents become disabled or get very old, 
they start living with children. TURKSTAT (2006a) data on life choices of individuals 
about old-age support this phenomenon. In 2006, while 50 percent of respondents who 
live in urban areas said that they are planning to live with their children when they get 
old, 65 percent of respondents who live in rural areas gave the same response 
(TURKSTAT 2006a). 
In addition to caring and social support among different generations, there are 
also financial transfers between older and younger generations. Hence, there is a 
reciprocal relationship within families in terms of social (caring) and financial (money) 
transfers. Albertini et al. (2007) have shown that there is a downward social and financial 
transfer flow from older parents to younger adults in all welfare regimes. However, using 
mostly European data on health and ageing, Daatland and Lowenstein (2005) and 
Albertini et al. (2007) found that social and financial transfers from older parents to 
younger adults are more intense in the Southern European countries than in the Social 
Democratic and the Continental European countries. This downward flow is also the case 
for the Turkish welfare regime in which older parents are involved in child care and 
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support their children’s household income with their pension incomes or other resources. 
For instance, after mothers, grandmothers are responsible for childcare of the 0-5 year 
age group in the household. In 2006, 3.3 percent of children aged 0-5 were cared by their 
grandmothers, while only 0.5 percent of them were cared by their fathers (TURKSTAT 
2006a). Therefore, contrary to the general assumption which considers the elderly as a 
burden on society, downward social and financial transfers in families show that the 
elderly have a noteworthy role in the distribution of welfare across generations. Pensions 
and other incomes are used to contribute to the welfare of the younger adults in the 
family. Hence, in light of Daatland and Lowenstein (2005) and Albertini et al. (2007) 
findings, it can be observed that public pensions for the old are shared by younger 
generations as well.     
4.3.2. The welfare of the Old: Local Actors and NGOs 
Local actors and NGOs play a relatively a minor role compared to the family in the 
welfare of the old. Their role is mostly achieved through cash and in kind transfers to the 
needy elderly. Unfortunately, data limitations on the age structure of aid recipients make 
it difficult to document the age groups that mostly benefit from aid. There is also a lack 
of data on which specific groups are targeted by NGOs. 
In addition to aid, there are also other social services provided by local actors, 
such as elderly homes—accommodation facilities intended for the elderly. Elderly homes 
are mostly managed by the state agency, the General Directorate of Social Services and 
Child Protection Agency (SHÇEK), or Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu, in 
Turkish. In 2011, out of 23,213 elderly living in elderly homes, 61 percent of them were 
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staying in public elderly homes, while 25 percent and 14 percent of them were staying in 
elderly homes managed by private entrepreneurs and NGOs (SHÇEK 2011). There were 
only about 3,400 people living in elderly homes managed by NGOs. Despite the minor 
roles of NGOs in elderly care, in order to increase the quantity and quality of social 
services the General Directorate of Social Services plans to collaborate more with the 
private sector and NGOs (SHÇEK 2009).  
4.3.3. The Welfare of the Old: The Market  
In the 1980s and 1990s, in line with a neo-liberal paradigm, the pension system evolved 
toward a market-oriented structure (Elveren 2008b: 214). One of the important 
developments was the introduction of the voluntary pension systems as a third tier in 
addition to occupational PAYG systems. The law no. 4632 on Individual Pension System 
(henceforth IPS) came into force and a third tier of the Turkish pension system was 
constituted in 2001. After some regulatory changes that strengthen the base of IPS, it 
commenced in 2003 with the participation of six private pension companies. The aims of 
the IPS were to provide additional retirement income to middle and high income earners, 
to increase national savings by directing participants’ savings into long-term financial 
investments, and to make the financial markets stronger (Elveren 2008b; PMC 2010). 
Contributors in the IPS can retire at age 56 after ten years of contribution and they may 
choose to get back their investments in the form of an annuity or to obtain a lump-sum 
payment on retirement (Elveren 2008a: 44).  
Contrary to the World Bank and the IMF, which support private schemes, Orszag 
and Stiglitz (2001) assert that private pension schemes are not always the right direction 
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for social welfare. Even though defined contribution private pension schemes are 
important income resources for many retirees, there are significant critiques to these 
plans due to low returns and high operation costs. According to Elveren (2008b), 
voluntary pension schemes would disadvantage women and lower income classes in 
countries like Turkey, with its unstable labour market based on a gendered division of 
labour and high wage fluctuations among occupational groups. 
Despite critiques of the private pension systems, the number of participants in the 
IPS increased in the period between 2003 and 2011. As Table 4.4 indicates, in December 
2003, when the IPS was established, there were only about 15,000 participants in this 
voluntary pension system, while it increased to about 2.4 million participants in April 
2011. The total accumulated contributions also increased over the period from 5.9 million 
in 2003 to about 10.3 billion in April 2011.  According to Pension Monitoring Center 
(PMC 2010), while total funds accumulated in the private pension system are only 1 
percent of GDP in 2009, it is expected that the total funds accumulated will reach 10 
percent of GDP by 2023 (PMC 2010). Clearly, tax deduction incentives offered by the 
government play a significant role in the enhancement of individual pensions systems 
(PMC 2010). 
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Table 4.4. 
 Development of Private Pension Schemes, Turkey, 2003-2011 
  
Number of 
Participants 
(thousand) 
Total Accumulated 
Contributions (million TL) 
2003    15 5.9 
2004  314 288.3 
2005  673 1,117.2 
2006  1,074 2,592.5 
2007  1,458 3,917.1 
2008  1,745 5,467.7 
2009  1,988 7,102.0 
2010  2,281 9,515.2 
2011  2,406 10,302.8 
Source: PMC 2011, http://egm.org.tr/weblink/BESgostergeler.htm. 
 
4.3.4. The Welfare of the Old: The State  
Besides co-residency and financial transfers, health care is another significant factor that 
influences the well-being of the elderly. Contrary to the Social Democratic welfare 
regime, there is no universal health care system in Turkey. Basic health care is provided 
by the state for those who pay social security premiums. Spouses and dependent children 
of the insurant also enjoy health care benefits through three different social security 
institutions (these institutions—ES, SSK and the Bağ-Kur—will be examined in 4.3.4). 
In addition, the poor and children under 18 years are entitled to benefit from the same 
health care services without paying social security premiums. When dependants and the 
poor are included, the health care system covers almost the whole population. As Table 
4.5 shows, only 4 percent of the population was covered by health care services in 1950, 
while coverage increased to 95 percent in 2010. People who are not covered by the health 
care system are generally young people who have completed their education but have not 
started working or people working informally.  
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Table 4.5. 
Percentage of the Insured People in the Whole Population, Turkey, 1950-2010 
  
Active 
Insured i Pensioners
 ii Insured Dependant iii 
Total 
Insured 
Population iv 
Insured 
Population 
Covered by 
Health 
Servicesv 
1950  1.0  0.04  2.96  4.0 4.0  
1960  1.3  0.2  4.3  5.8  5.8  
1970  6.1  0.9  18.8  25.8  25.8  
1980  10.5  2.8  33.2  46.5  36.3  
1990  14.3  5.2  46.8  66.3  60.6  
2000  17.5  8.8  55.9  82.2  80.9  
2010  22.0  12.9  48.1  83.0  95.0  
Sources: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr; SPO 2011, http://dpt.gov.tr. 
Notes: i) Active insured covers only active workers who pay social security premium and voluntary active 
insured who do not work but pay social security premium.  
ii) Pensioners include retired, invalid, widow, widower, and orphan. 
iii) Dependants include spouses or children of insured person. 
iv) Total insured population includes active insured, pensioners, and their dependants.  
v) The poor and children under 18 years old are covered by general health care system without 
paying social security premium.  
 
As Table 4.5 indicates, in 1950, the percentage of active insured people, who contribute 
to the social security system, in the whole population was 1 percent. If their dependants 
and pensioners are included, only 4 percent of population was covered by a social 
security institution in 1950. Institutionalization of social security services gave rise to an 
increase in the number of insured population over the period in Turkey. By 2010, the 
percentage of insured people (active insured, dependants, and pensioners) increased to 83 
percent of the whole population, while pensioners increased to 12.9 percent of the whole 
population. Contrary to the dramatic increase in the percentage of pensioners, total active 
insured, who contribute to the system, did not considerably increase within 60 years. The 
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percentage of the active insured people consisting of active workers and voluntarily 
active insured who do not work but pay social security premium was only 22 percent in 
2010.  
Pensions are the main resource which provides permanent earnings in old-age. 
Pension income is provided by the state for those who paid old-age pension premiums. 
Since these pensions are based on defined benefit pension system and protected from 
economic fluctuation, retirees enjoy relatively higher incomes compared to younger 
workers in Turkey. The net pension replacement rate in 2009 for an average income 
earner in Turkey was one of the highest in OECD region at 124.7, compared to the 
OECD average of 70.3 (OECD 2009: 121).6 
According to the OECD (2011d), public transfers are important income resources 
for the elderly in many countries. As an average for the OECD countries, public transfers 
account for 60 percent of average total income of the elderly, while work and capital 
gains account for 21 percent and 19 percent of average total income in the mid-2000s. 
However, in Turkey, in addition to pension and other public transfers which account for 
46 percent of the total income, work is another significant resource adding up to 41 
percent of the total income, with capital gains and investments accounting for 13 percent 
(OECD 2011d).  
                                               
6 The net replacement rate is the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings, 
taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners. 
The gap between gross and net replacement rates varies substantially across countries (OECD 2011d). 
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of resources of pension income for the elderly in 
2005. About 41 percent received a pension from one of the three social security 
institutions in 2005. Approximately 22 percent received a means-tested basic targeted 
pension, and the remaining 37 percent received no pension income. Many of those 
receiving neither pension nor means-tested income are probably wives of pensioners, 
who qualify for a survivor benefit in the event of the primary pensioner’s death. For 
example, about 50 percent of the ES and 33 percent of the SSK and the Bağ-Kur 
pensioners aged 65 and older are survivors or orphans who have no other registered 
income (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 19).  
Source: OECD 2006, Figure 4.6, pp. 147. 
As highlighted, pension is the most important income resources for most of the elderly in 
Turkey. In the next part, after a brief history of pension policies, general characteristics of 
Figure 4.1. 
Sources of income for people aged 65+ in Turkey, in 2005 
Bag-Kur 
11.4%
No pension income 
37.0%
Basic targeted 
pension 
22.0% 
SSK 13.3% 
ES 
16.3% 
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the pension systems, pension reforms and, main problems of the system will be 
examined. 
4.3.4.1. Pension Regime in Turkey  
Even though there was no modern pension system in Turkey until the late 1940s, there 
were some arrangements for civil servants during the 19th century. The first social 
security arrangements for civil servants can be traced back to 1866 when pension funds 
for soldiers were established. In the late 19th century, various pension funds were 
established for other groups such as soldiers, civil servants, and mining workers (Ozbek 
2006). In 1906, in order to create a unified pension system, different pension funds were 
merged under the name of Fund of Military and Civilian Authorities. Despite this reform 
attempt, the system did not cover most of the workers, including civil servants, and it was 
still fragmentary. 
After World War II, certain international standards in social security were 
formulated by various international organizations. The most significant international 
agreements approved by Turkish Governments are: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 102 on Social 
Security accepted in 1952, and the European Social Security Code in 1976 (Elveren 
2008b: 215; SETA 2010: 4). These conventions brought important improvements to 
employees’ working conditions and social security. These international agreements 
overlapped with the import-substituting industrialization economic policies based on high 
wages for workers and high profits for businessmen. During the 1950s and 1960s, these 
policies assisted modern social security regulations to come into practice in Turkey. 
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The Ministry of Labour as well as three main social security institutions in Turkey 
were formed within the framework of these international agreements. First, in 1946, the 
Social Insurance Institution or Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu in Turkish (henceforth SSK)  
was established in order to protect blue-collar workers employed in the public sector as 
well as all workers in the private sector against a broad range of social risks such as work 
injury, sickness, and old-age. Second, in 1949, fragmentary structure of pension system 
became deeper when a separate social security system, the Retirement Fund or Emekli 
Sandığı in Turkish (henceforth ES) was established for only white-collar employees 
working in state institutions. The ES provided its contributors with various benefits in 
addition to retirement pension such as job disability pension, disability pension, 
survivor’s pension, and lump-sum payments. Lastly, the Social Security Institution of 
Craftsmen Tradesmen and Other Self-Employed People or Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diğer 
Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu in Turkish (henceforth Bağ-Kur) was 
established in 1971 to cover craftsmen, merchants, agricultural workers, and the 
remaining self-employed people. This institution provides relatively fewer social benefits 
and old-age entitlements compared to the ES and SSK. Social security coverage provided 
by the Bağ-Kur was broadened for citizens working abroad in 1978 and for housewives 
in 1979. Contrary to the SSK and ES, Bağ-Kur provided relatively low levels of benefits, 
such as disability insurance, old-age insurance, and health insurance. A fragmentary 
structure in social security also exists in the Continental and Southern European welfare 
regimes. Table 4.6 presents changes in the number of insured people (active insured, 
dependants, and pensioners) in three occupational social security institutions. While 36.3 
percent of the insured population was covered by the ES and 63.7 percent of the insured 
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population was covered by the SSK in 1970, the percentages of the insured population 
were 14 for the ES, 62 for the SSK, and 24 for the Bağ-Kur in 2005. Even though the 
member of all social security institutions had increased from around 9 million to 66.5 
million by 2005, the increase was especially significant in the SSK and Bağ-Kur.  
 
Table 4.6.  
Insured People in Three Social Security Institutions, Turkey, 1970-2005 
 ES SSK Bağ-Kur Total  
  
Total 
(million) % 
Total 
(million) % 
Total 
(million) % 
Total 
(million)  % 
1970  3.3 36.3 5.8 63.7 0.0 0.0 9.1  100.0 
1975  4.4 27.7 8.2 51.7 3.3 20.5 15.9  100.0 
1980  5.4 26.1 10.7 51.8 4.5 22.0 20.6  100.0 
1985  5.8 21.2 13.6 49.6 8.0 29.2 27.4  100.0 
1990  6.4 17.3 19.5 52.3 11.3 30.4 37.2  100.0 
1995  7.2 15.1 28.5 60.0 11.8 24.9 47.5  100.0 
2000  8.2 14.8 32.2 58.0 15.0 27.1 55.4  100.0 
2005  9.3 14.0 41.2 62.0 16.0 24.0 66.5  100.0 
Note:  See list of abbreviations at the beginning of the thesis. 
Source: SPO 2011, http://dpt.gov.tr. 
 
In addition to these social security institutions for different occupation groups which 
represent the inegalitarian corporatist character of the Turkish welfare regime, the 
Directory of Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund (henceforth the Solidarity Fund) was 
established in 1986. The Solidarity Fund is a state institution designed as a charitable 
organization, which provides cash and in kind benefits for needy people based on means-
tested benefits but without well defined social rights (Bugra and Keyder 2003: 36).   
Due to various system changes based on populist measures, the retirement system 
for the young Turkish population has faced many problems since the late 1960s. When 
the Turkish social security system was first established, the pension eligibility age for 
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men and women was 60 and the premium payment requirement based on level of an 
individual’s income was 25 years. In 1969, pension eligibility age was abolished, while in 
1976 the premium payment requirement for women was reduced to 20 years. In 1986, 
pension eligibility age was set at 60 years of age for men and 55 years of age for women 
(Oral 2008: 137). The last populist retirement law was passed in 1992. The 1992 law 
replaced the minimum retirement age requirement by a minimum period of attachment to 
the social security system. This law eliminated the minimum retirement age and set the 
premium payment requirement at 20 years (7,200 days) for women and 25 years (9,000 
days) for men. The 1992 legislation effectively brought down the pension eligibility 
age to 38 for women and 43 for men for those who started to work at the age of 18 
(World Bank 2006: 48). According to OECD (2011d) estimations in 2010, a retired 
woman at age 41 with a life expectancy of 78 may enjoy an average retirement period of 
37 years. Therefore, due to the early retirement options, Turkey has the longest average 
period of pension eligibility among OECD countries (OECD 2011d: 29). 
Numerous changes in pension laws show how populism has played an important 
role in pension polices. The Turkish pension system was changed nine times over the 
period 1954-1999 (SETA 2010: 12). Most of these pension laws were passed before the 
elections in order to get political support. Also, there was another facet of early 
retirement polices which constituted populist characteristics of the welfare regime. 
Similar to the previous pension system changes, the 1992 changes in the Labour Act were 
promoted not only as a gift for current employees who retired at very young ages, but 
also as an employment opportunity for unemployed youth. Table 4.7 presents 
unemployment rates for young and old people in Turkey over the period of 1990-2010. 
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There have been significant increases in unemployment rates for 15-24 and 25-29 age 
groups for both sexes for twenty years. While men’s unemployment rates for 15-24 and 
25-29 age groups were 16.6 and 8.4 percent in 1990, they increased to 20 percent and 
13.4 percent by 2010. However, men’s unemployment rate for 60-64 and 65 and above 
age groups slightly increased from 3.4 percent and 1.8 percent in 1990 to 5.7 percent and 
2.1 percent in 2010. Unemployment rates of women in the age groups 60-64 and 65 and 
above declined from 3.4 percent to 1.1 percent and 1.8 to 0.1 in the period between 1990 
and 2010. Hence, similar to the Continental and Southern European welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Myles 2002), early retirement options were used to reduce 
persistent high unemployment rates when governments are not able to create new 
employment opportunities for their citizens. 
Table 4.7. 
Unemployment Rates by Age and Sex, Turkey, 1990-2010 
 Men Women 
  
15-
24 
25-
29 
60-
64 65+ Total 
15-
24 
25-
29 
60-
64 65+ Total 
1990 16.6 8.4 3.4 1.8 7.8 15.0 8.4 3.4 1.8 8.5 
1995 16.9 8.7 2.4 1.5 7.8 13.1 8.7 2.4 1.5 7.3 
2000 13.7 7.2 2.7 0.7 6.6 11.9 7.2 2.7 0.7 6.3 
2005 19.5 12.4 3.7 1.1 10.4 20.6 12.4 0.9 0.1 11.2 
2006 18.3 12.4 3.8 1.0 9.9 20.7 12.4 0.3 0.3 11.1 
2007 19.6 11.8 4.1 1.2 10.0 20.8 11.8 0.8 0.0 11.0 
2008 20.1 12.6 4.9 1.2 10.7 21.2 12.6 0.8 0.6 11.6 
2009 24.4 16.7 5.6 1.8 13.9 25.0 16.7 0.6 0.3 14.3 
2010 20.0 13.6 5.7 2.1 11.4 23.0 13.6 1.1 0.1 13.0 
Source: TURKSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr. 
Contrary to some countries, which face social security challenges due to demographic 
factors that negatively affect financial balances and the pension systems, the problem of 
the Turkish social security stems from totally different factors. According to the World 
Bank (2006), about 50 percent of men age 55 and over in cities had pensions in 1994. 
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The social security system began to produce a deficit in 1993, due not to population 
ageing but as the result of populist policies, irresponsible use of social security funds, and 
even corruption (TUSIAD 2004; SETA 2010). In order to compensate for the deficits of 
the social security institutions (combined budget deficit of the pension and public health 
systems), the state has contributed to the social security system through budgetary 
transfers since the mid-1990s. Table 4.8 shows the budgetary transfers from the public 
budget to the SSK, Bağ-Kur, and ES during the period 1998-2010.  
In 1998, the total transfer to these institutions was about 1.5 billion TL 
($1=1.6TL) and budgetary transfers constituted 2.1 percent of the GDP (for revenues and 
expenditures of social security institutions, see Table 4.A.1). The budgetary transfers to 
these institutions have significantly increased, and total budgetary transfers reached 55 
billion TL, representing 5 percent of GDP in 2010. Variations in budgetary transfers 
among these institutions were remarkable. Compared to other social security institutions, 
ES, which covers civil servants, received relatively higher budgetary transfers despite 
having fewer insured people. For example, in 2005, the budgetary transfer to the ES, 
which served 14 percent of the whole insured population, constituted 1.37 percent of the 
GDP, whereas it constituted 1.16 percent for the SSK—consisting of 62 percent of the 
whole insured population—and 1.07 percent for Bağ-Kur—consisting of 24 percent of 
the whole insured population (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8.  
Budgetary Transfers to Social Security Institutions, Turkey, 1998-2010 i 
  Budget Transfers (Million TL) 
Transfers as Proportion 
of Total GDP (%) 
  ES SSK Bağ-Kur Total 
Annual 
Change 
in 
Total 
% 
ES SSK Bağ-Kur Total 
1998  610 451 435 1,496 102.2 0.87 0.64 0.62 2.13 
1999  1,035 1,105 796 2,936 96.3 0.99 1.06 0.76 2.81 
2000  1,775 400 1,051 3,226 9.9 1.07 0.24 0.63 1.94 
2001  2,675 1,108 1,740 5,523 71 1.11 0.46 0.72 2.30 
2002  4,676 2,386 2,622 9,684 75 1.33 0.68 0.75 2.76 
2003  6,145 4,809 4,930 15,884 64 1.35 1.06 1.08 3.49 
2004  7,800 5,757 5,273 18,830 19 1.40 1.03 0.94 3.37 
2005  8,889 7,507 6,926 23,322 24 1.37 1.16 1.07 3.59 
2006  10,035 8,527 4,330 22,892 -2 1.32 1.12 0.57 3.02 
2007  12,675 14,156 6,229 33,060 44 1.50 1.68 0.74 3.92 
2008     35,016 6     3.68 
2009     52,600 50.2     5.52 
2010        55,244 5.0       5.03 
Note: i) Fiscal transfers to compensate both deficit of the pension and public health systems provided by 
the social security institutions. 
Source: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr. 
  
Some of the reasons for high budgetary transfers to social security institutions are a 
change in the worker to retiree balance, the informal nature of the labour market, and 
poor enforcement of pension laws by the state (TUSIAD 2004; Elveren 2008a: 43). In the 
late 1990s, it was apparent that the Turkish pension system was not sustainable due to a 
high budget deficit. There had been various pension reforms proposed by the World Bank 
and the IMF in many OECD countries as well as in Turkey (Aysan and Beaujot 2009). 
The chapter will now discuss the impact of international organizations in pension 
policies, the 1999 and 2006 reforms, and their influences on the Turkish welfare regime.  
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4.3.4.2. International Organizations and Reform Demands 
Having examined the corporatist structure of the pension system and the evolution of the 
pension structure in Turkey since the 1990s, the effects of international organizations will 
be discussed in this part. Social security reforms, as well as the national policy agenda in 
Turkey, have been discussed by international organizations especially since the 1990s. 
Orenstein (2008) highlights the decisive role of the transnational organizations in both 
pension reforms and the rise of private pensions all over the world. 
In Averting the Old-age Crisis, the World Bank (1994) advocated that the 
economic growth of nations and the financial security of the old would be better served if 
governments developed three pillars of old-age security. According to the World Bank 
(1994), the first pillar aims to reduce old-age poverty. It covers the redistribution of 
wealth through a publicly managed pension system with mandatory participation. The 
second and third pillars cover individual savings. While the second pillar consists of a 
privately managed mandatory savings system, the third pillar is defined contribution 
voluntary savings. In fact, the reform proposal of the World Bank stemmed mainly from 
two main factors. First, the idea that individuals should contribute more to their old-age 
savings through private pensions. Second, savings could be managed efficiently by 
means of a private saving system. Through this system, the state not only provides 
different saving options for individuals but also shares pension responsibility with the 
market.  
The World Bank and the IMF policy recommendations were very important for 
the stability of the Turkish economy which signed four stand-by agreements with the 
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IMF during the 1990s and 2000s. TUSIAD, the strongest organization representing 
business interests, supported the World Bank and the IMF policy recommendations about 
state administered pension systems and the privatization of PAYG, claiming that private 
pension systems will increase performance of the financial economy and individual 
welfare (TUSIAD 2004).  
In addition to international financial institutions, the European Union (EU) has 
had a significant influence on social policies and the labour market in Turkey. In order to 
join the EU, Turkey has to achieve serious social policy reforms, particularly in the 
social security system to prevent poverty. For some researchers, the EU process, which 
encourages rights-based and universalist approaches in social policy, mitigates the 
influence of the liberal agendas of international financial institutions (Bugra Keyder 
2006; Coban 2006). A report on sustainable pensions in Europe by the European 
Commission (2010) indicates the standpoint of the EU on pension systems. Contrary to 
the World Bank and the IMF, which emphasize re-commodification of pension systems, 
the EU emphasizes cost-containment or fiscally sustainable pensions through  
implementation of structural reforms such as sustainable economic growth, higher 
official retirement ages, strengthening work incentives, and fiscal consolidation (EC 
2010: 11). Moreover, the report warns European governments about the stability of 
pension systems and mandatory privately funded schemes in the long term (EC 2010: 
59). Hence, in addition to the unique characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, the 
agreements with the international financial institutions and EU accession criteria led to a 
conflict between market-oriented liberal inclinations and rights-based universalist 
approaches in social policies, particularly in pension policies. Within the framework of 
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these international actors and economic factors, two important social security reforms 
were realized in 1999 and 2006. In the next part, the reasons for the 1999 and 2006 
reforms and their influence on the Turkish welfare regime will be discussed.  
4.3.4.3. Transformation of the Turkish Welfare Regime and Pension Reforms after 
1999 
4.3.4.3.1. The Goal of Pension Reforms 
Besides the external factors outlined in the previous section, the main internal factors 
for pension reform in Turkey were the increasing social security deficits since 1993, and 
the prospect of losing Turkey’s demographic opportunity window due to the ageing 
population by the year 2035 (SSI 2004). For example, as shown in Table 4.8, despite its 
young population, fiscal transfers from general budget to three social security institutions 
(SSK, ES, and Bağ-Kur) comprised 5.03 percent of GDP in 2010 (SSI 2011). Moreover, 
a comparative table on old-age expenditures also shows how old-age expenditures 
increased in OECD countries over the period between 1990 and 2007 relative to GDP 
(see Table 4.9). While France had the highest public pension spending with 10.6 percent 
of GDP in 1990, Italy was the highest at 14.1 percent in 2007. Public pension spending in 
the Liberal and Social Democratic countries, such as Canada and Norway were low, 
whereas the Southern and Continental European countries, such as Greece and France, 
had a public pension spending rate above the OECD average. Although Turkey had the 
lowest public pension spending with 2.4 percent of GDP in 1990, its old-age expenditures 
increased to 6.1 percent in 2007. That is, public pension expenditures more than doubled 
relative to the national income over the period between 1990 and 2007.  
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Table 4.9. 
Public Pension Expenditures in OECD countries, 1990-2007 i 
 Level (% of GDP) Change % 
 1990 2007 1990-2007 
Canada 4.2 4.2 -1.2 
Denmark 5.1 5.6 8.6 
France 10.6 12.5 17.5 
Germany 9.0 10.7 19.1 
Greece 9.9 11.9 20.9 
Ireland 3.9 3.6 -7.7 
Italy 10.1 14.1 38.9 
Netherlands 6.7 4.7 -29.8 
New Zealand 7.4 4.3 -41.8 
Norway 5.6 4.7 -16.6 
Portugal 4.9 10.8 119.8 
Spain 7.9 8.0 1.5 
Sweden 7.7 7.2 -6.8 
Turkey 2.4 6.1 159.2 
United Kingdom 4.8 5.4 11.0 
United States 6.1 6.0 -1.5 
OECD 6.1 7.0 14.5 
Note: i) Public pension expenditure is public cash benefits for the old and survivors. 
Source: OECD 2011d, pp.155. 
In order to establish a more sustainable pension system, the Turkish state aims to keep the 
fiscal deficit originating from the pension cost at less than 1 percent of GDP in the near 
future (Verbeken 2007: 5). As mentioned before, such a high social security deficit does 
not stem from demographic ageing in Turkey, but it stems from populist policies, poor 
political decisions, and even corruption. Hence, the main problems of the past pension 
systems are that these systems were organized to cover people with occupation based 
social security institutions (see Table 4.5 and 4.6) and many people benefited from 
pension incomes at relatively younger ages without paying adequate pension premiums 
(Alper 2005: 12). 
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While Turkey’s high number of young retired people poses a threat to the ratios of 
active compared to passive insurants, informal employment negatively impacts the 
earnings of social security institutions. Hence, the system faces double jeopardy. While a 
significant number of young retirees benefit from the system, relatively low labour force 
participation and informal labour force participation make the pension system 
unsustainable. The percentage of the labour force with social security coverage was only 
about 63 percent for men and 42 percent for women in 2010 (see Table 4.10). That is, 
about 50 percent of the labour force contributes to the social security system. Social 
security coverage was particularly low at ages 55-64 and 65 and older, for both sexes (see 
Table 4.10). While the former is 32.6 percent for men and 8.1 percent for women, the 
latter is 15.6 for men and 3 percent for women in 2010. For the age group 50-59 only 
about 20 percent of men contributed to a social security institution, while about 55 
percent of men aged 50-59 received a pension in 2005 and 25 percent of men participated 
in the labour force informally (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 11). Hence, the challenge 
for the public budget is serious; how should increasing social security costs be managed 
in a relatively young population? Next section explores pension reforms and their impacts 
on gender and generational equity.   
4.3.4.3.2. Pension Reforms 
The law number 4447 legislated in 1999 was the first significant reform which aimed to 
solve the problems of the social security system. This reform only focused on the Bağ-
Kur and SSK, and excluded the ES. This reform implemented a two-pillar pension 
system: the first pillar was managed by the social security institutions based on the 
PAYG system and the second pillar was based on private pension schemes (Elveren 
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2008a: 44). This reform increased the pension contribution period from 5,000 to 7,000 
days and shortened the average benefit period by gradually fixing the minimum 
retirement age at 60 for men and 58 for women over a period of 20 years (OECD 2006).  
Even though the 1999 reform brought some improvements to the pension system, 
it was still inadequate to achieve a sustainable and modern social security system. In 
2004, a new proposal for social security reform was initiated by the government. This 
reform aimed to provide wider coverage for basic health services, to reform the existing 
social security institutions, and to set up a new overarching institution under a single 
administrative body (Elveren 2008a).  
In 2006, the new social security law was passed in parliament (see Appendix box 
for the details of the pension reform). The 2006 reform consisted of four key elements 
(SSI 2004). The first component of the reform is the implementation of a general health 
insurance system which aims to provide equal health coverage for every citizen through 
providing basic health services. The second component of the reform is to establish a 
single pension system which covers different social security institutions (SSK, ES, and 
Bağ-Kur) where social security rights are equal. The third element is to establish an 
overarching social assistance system that coordinates all means-tested social assistances 
equally, and in a manner accessible for all citizens. The last component is to establish a 
new and uniform institutional structure that provides integrity in the social security 
services. This law is particularly crucial in transforming the corporatist and inegalitarian 
feature of the Turkish welfare regime by replacing the separate social security institutions 
(SSK, ES, and Bağ-Kur) with a new and overarching institution—Social Security 
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Institution. Through the new system, some of the privileges of civil servants, such as 
higher incomes and pension entitlements were lowered and a relatively more equal 
structure was formed. 
Similar to the 1999 reform, the 2006 social security law gradually increased the 
minimum official retirement age from 58 to 65 for women and from 60 to 65 for men. 
However, the minimum retirement age will be 65 only by 2036, and it will be gradually 
equalized at 65 for both sexes between 2036 and 2048. In addition to increasing 
minimum retirement ages, the reform gradually increased the average pension 
contribution period from 7,000 to 9,000 days for both sexes.  
Similar to other Southern European countries, these four components of the 
reform were mainly implemented to achieve the recalibration of the social security 
system. Recalibration is the most important target of this reform. Recalibration means the 
removal of inefficient regulations. For example, forming a new and uniform institution, 
the Social Security Institution, will improve the ability of the state to accurately monitor 
revenues and expenses, as well as to provide better services for its citizens (Brook and 
Whitehouse 2006: 7). Increasing the official retirement age due to increasing life 
expectancy can also be considered recalibration.  
Introducing a single pension formula based on more sustainable parameters, and 
increasing the average pension contribution period represent cost containment in the new 
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pension system.7 Even though the importance of private pensions increases in old-age 
welfare, the result is not the re-commodification of the pension system. This is due to the 
strong support of the defined benefit pension systems by the government. Hence, similar 
to the Southern European welfare regime, de-commodification remains moderate in 
Turkey compared to the Liberal welfare regime.  
4.3.4.4. Pension Problems in Turkey: Intergenerational Justice and Gender 
Inequalities 
Despite fundamental pension reforms in the last decade, there are two important 
problems posing a threat for the welfare of society in terms of the pension structure and 
the labour market in Turkey.  
3.4.4.1. Intergenerational Justice 
Intergenerational equity issues are important discussion themes in pension reform (Myles 
2002; 2003). In the Turkish case, however, intergenerational equity is largely overlooked 
in pension reform discussions. Two main changes in the pension system—the rising 
retirement age and decreasing accrual rate—may be considered a threat to 
intergenerational equity and younger generations’ welfare. While the older generations 
benefited from relatively high pension incomes at relatively young ages, without paying 
pension premiums for a long period of time, the younger generations must work more to 
                                               
7 Net pension replacement rates in Turkey are one of the highest across OECD countries.  This is mainly 
due to the fact that pensioners do not pay income tax or health insurance premiums in Turkey contrary to 
most of the OECD countries. In addition, the accrual rate, which is the rate at which pension benefits build 
up for each year of coverage, in Turkey is very high with 2.5 percent per annum. The 2006 reform aimed to 
decrease the accrual rate to 2 percent by 2016 (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 8). 
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be entitled to old-age benefits. Even though these are significant concerns in relation to 
intergenerational equity, the real problem that poses a threat to intergenerational equity 
and welfare of younger generations is difficulties in standard employment opportunities 
for the young. Indeed, these challenges are the consequences of the transformation of the 
Turkish welfare regime. This section will discuss why rising retirement age and 
decreasing accrual rates are not the real problem in terms of intergenerational equity. 
The first debate about intergenerational equity is that due to the increase in the 
minimum retirement age, younger generations will have to work more than the older 
generations. As mentioned, both pension reforms raised the minimum age threshold for 
men from around 45 to a benchmark between 60 and 65. Previously, people could retire 
in their late 40s and continue to work after their retirement. The average effective age of 
retirement for men in Turkey was almost the same as the OECD average, which was 63 
in 2005 (OECD 2011a). For example, on the standard assumption of labour force entry at 
age 20, a man who started to work at age 20 in 1962 retired after 43 year of work in 2005. 
Since the retirement age will continue to be 60 for those who start to work before 2008, a 
young man who started to work at age 25 after completing his university degree in 2005 
would retire after 35 year of work in 2040. Put it differently, compared to their parents, 
younger generations will stay approximately the same period of time in the labour force. 
Also, although the minimum retirement age has been increased, this will be implemented 
gradually. According to the 2006 reform, the minimum retirement age for men will not be 
set at age 65 until 2036. Also, the minimum retirement age for both sexes will be 
equalized at 65, but only by 2048. Therefore, it is misleading to claim that younger 
generation will have to work longer after the pension reforms in Turkey.    
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The second concern about the 2006 reform is the reduction of accrual rates after 
the reform. According to OECD projections, in defined benefit plans, pension benefits 
are calculated according to the accrual rate. The accrual rate or accrual factor is the rate at 
which pension benefits build up for each year of coverage (OECD 2011b). Before the 
2006 reform, the accrual rates were 3.5 percent per annum for the first 10 years (or 3,600 
days), 2 percent per annum  between the 10th and 25th year ( 15 year or 5,400 days), then 
1.5 percent per annum after 25th year of social security coverage. Between 2008 and 
2015, transitionary pension rules will be applied. In this period, the accrual rate will be 3 
percent for those who had already started to work in 2006. For those who started to work 
after 2008, the accrual rate will be 2.5 percent per annum for every year until 2015 and 
then 2 percent per annum for every year after that. After 2016, the accrual rate will be 2 
percent per annum for all people (see Appendix). Put differently, people have to work 
more in the formal sector for the same pension after the reform. It should be noted that 
despite the decline in the accrual rate, Turkey has relatively high accrual rates compared 
to other OECD countries (OECD 2009). However, since people will contribute to social 
security for a longer time, decreasing the accrual rate will not necessarily imply lower 
retirement incomes.  
The pre-2006 pension system will continue to strongly affect retirement age and 
pension benefits in the next decades (Brook and Whitehouse 2006: 12). In 2006, more 
than 75 percent of pensioners were younger than the benchmark of 65 years, and this 
percentage will remain high in the first half of the 21st century (Brook and Whitehouse 
2006: 9). According to OECD (2006) estimations, many people will still be eligible for 
pensions in their early 50s by 2020. According to Brook and Whitehouse’s (2006) 
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estimations, the only birth cohorts to encounter the impact of the 2006 pension reform 
will be 1980s births cohort and over who started to work after the reform, while the 
1970s-birth cohorts can still retire relatively young. Therefore, the raising retirement age 
and decreasing accrual rate will not fundamentally affect pension incomes of the most of 
most young adults. 
The main problem causing intergenerational inequity is the lack of well-paid 
standard jobs for the young. As mentioned in the previous section, the surplus labour in 
the state-owned enterprises and the early retirement options were a way of welfare 
redistribution provided by populist governments in Turkey in the period from the 1960s 
to the late 1990s. Through relaxing retirement rules, governments aimed to guarantee 
political support of middle-aged groups who would retire earlier and young voters who 
would have more job opportunities because of these retirements.  
As indicated earlier, populist policies that change retirement ages, are no longer a 
means of welfare distribution in Turkey. The Turkish state has already privatized the 
biggest state-owned enterprises, such as telecommunication, mining, and energy. Neo-
liberal globalization and international competition oblige private companies to recruit 
contractors who have part-time unregistered workers. Until the 2000s or even later, it was 
common for people to officially retire from one of the social security institutions, and 
then to continue to work unregistered. This employment strategy was reasonable for both 
employers who do not have to pay extra social security contributions on behalf of their 
old employees, and employees who would have social security and receive pension 
income, paying neither social security contributions nor income tax. However, cohorts 
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who start to work after the 2006 reform will not be able to follow this strategy since they 
will retire at older ages. They have to work until 65 and pay social security contribution 
for 25 years (9,000 days). However, in a more fragile employment market, it might be 
difficult for younger generations to find a well-paid and secure job for 25 years.   
It should be noted that intergenerational equity problems arising from pension 
reforms are not peculiar to Turkey and the Turkish welfare regime (Phillipson 2000; 
Aysan 2011). Turkey, however, faces double jeopardy because of budget deficits in its 
pension system in spite of its younger population. In the near future, when it loses its 
demographic opportunity window, the financial constraints on the pension system will be 
more intense. Despite the significant improvements of the 2006 reform in achieving a 
sustainable and fair pension system, more needs to be done to encourage formal 
employment and to decrease intergenerational inequity.  
4.3.4.4.2. Gender Inequalities 
In addition to the state and the market, the family is one of the important actors that 
determine the characteristics of a welfare regime and gender inequality. Similar to the 
Southern European countries in which the family is the main pillar in welfare 
distribution, such as child care and elder care, social services are provided by the unpaid 
domestic work of women. However, Turkey did not have labour policies that provided 
pension benefits for mothers who were out of the labour force caring for children until 
1979. A main gender inequality problem not only in the labour market, but also in 
pension system stems from “the divergent gender-based care giving and work patterns” 
(Estes 2005: 553). 
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There are two important problems affecting gender inequality in the Turkish 
pension system. First of all, similar to other pension systems in the OECD region, the 
social security system is based on premium contributions. The elderly receive old-age 
benefits, only if they contribute to the system or they are dependants of insurants, such as 
orphans or widows. As Table 4.10 shows, in a welfare regime where a gendered division 
of labour is common, the percentage of the labour force with social security coverage was 
only about 63 percent for men and 42 percent for women in 2010. Even though the 
number of women with social security coverage increased, particularly in young age 
groups (e.g. from 43.5 percent to 57.5 percent for age 20-29) between 2000 and 2010, 
women’s low labour force participation rates (e.g. urban labour force participation was 
about 28 percent for women compared to 71 percent for men in 2010) pose a threat to the 
welfare of women in their retirement years. TURKSTAT (2011) data also indicate that 60 
percent of women were doing temporary work and 27 percent of self-employed women 
did not have social security coverage in 2009. As highlighted before, since 83 percent of 
the population has social security coverage, a great number of women are taking 
advantage of the system through their spouses’ or father’s social security coverage. This 
reconstructs the gendered division of labour and gender inequalities.     
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Table 4.10.  
Percentage of Labour Force (employed and unemployed) in Social Security 
Coverage by Age and Sex, Turkey, 2000-2010 
 Men Women 
  
20-
29 
30-
54 
55-
64 65+ Total 
20-
29 
30-
54 
55-
64 65+ Total 
2000  53.0 49.9 42.8 24.5 55.6 43.5 30.2 5.2 3.6 30.2 
2005  56.5 66.5 33.9 20.6 57.6 50.2 34.7 5.7 1.8 35.0 
2006  58.3 67.1 32.6 19.5 58.6 52.5 36.9 6.0 2.0 37.0 
2007  62.3 67.8 28.6 14.2 59.9 55.4 38.7 5.3 1.3 39.3 
2008  66.6 69.0 29.9 12.9 61.9 59.0 41.0 5.9 1.3 41.6 
2009  64.5 69.8 31.5 13.4 61.7 57.5 42.1 8.8 3.1 41.6 
2010  65.8 70.9 32.6 15.6 62.8 57.5 41.9 8.1 3.0 41.5 
Source: TURSTAT 2011, http://tuik.gov.tr. 
In Turkey, mothers who care for children and the elderly typically experience career 
interruptions. However, similar to the Southern European countries, the Turkish state 
expects families and especially women to bear caring responsibilities. Inadequate state 
support results in lower labour force participation rates and lower pension income returns 
for women. For instance, while Norway provides paid time off work up to 44 weeks for 
mothers, paid maternal leave in Turkey is only 16 weeks—eight weeks of maternity leave 
prior to delivery and eight weeks after the delivery. Moreover, while in many countries 
childcare is considered a responsibility of both mothers and fathers and parental leave is 
provided to fathers, there is only a three day paternal leave and it is only for public sector 
employees in Turkey. 
Second, not surprisingly, at all ages and all educational levels, women’s incomes 
are relatively lower than those of men in Turkey. Lower incomes and career interruptions 
lead women to have lower pension entitlements. Indeed, in order to understand gender 
inequality in the labour market and its impacts on the Turkish pension system, one needs 
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to differentiate women who do not have standard jobs, such as temporary employees and 
unpaid family workers, and educated women who work at well-paid standard jobs. 
Having a university degree significantly increases women’s earnings and narrows the 
gender income gap. According to TURKSTAT (2006b), university graduate women earn 
three times more than their primary school graduate counterparts. Also while vocational 
school graduate women earn 33 percent less than their male counterparts, university 
graduate women earn 18 percent less than their male counterparts (TURKSTAT 2006b).    
In order to analyze gender inequality with regard to education level and residence, 
Eleveren (2008a) projected the pension incomes of various groups for both men and 
women who work 30 years in full-time jobs in Turkey. According to Elveren’s (2008a) 
estimations, gender inequality in pension incomes changes with education level and 
residence characteristics. The gender inequality is less in urban areas than for rural areas, 
and, as the education level rises, the inequality gap narrows. For example, while a 
university graduate woman in an urban area earns 57 percent of the income of a man who 
has the same education, a primary school graduate in an urban area earns only 46 percent 
of a man’s income. However, in the 2000s educated women who work in professional 
jobs faced less pension loss (TURKSTAT 2006b).  
The establishment of the private pension system in 2004 offered people 
alternative pension plans. Compared to voluntary defined contribution schemes, gender 
inequality problems are relatively less severe in defined benefit PAYG pensions. The 
private pension plans are not designed to strengthen social welfare of all older groups, 
rather they are a way of creating extra income for upper-income and middle-income 
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earners who contribute to the private pension system on a regular basis. Hence, private 
pension plans based on defined benefit contribution schemes would increase the gender 
inequality gap (Elveren 2008a). Due to the significant interruption in women’s 
employment history they may earn less pension income through private pension schemes 
and this may increase the gender income inequality between men and women in old-age.  
4.4. Conclusion 
The welfare distribution for the elderly has become a significant social and political 
challenge for many welfare regimes. For the Turkish welfare regime which is undergoing 
a significant transformation, social and financial challenges are particularly serious. 
Traditional Turkish families, the main actors in welfare distribution, have been 
challenged by cultural dynamics, such as modernization and individualization, and 
economic factors, such as increases in the number of women in paid work. These 
challenges not only influence traditional families but also the welfare regime of Turkey in 
general and the welfare of the old in particular. The welfare transferred downward and 
upward between the younger and the older generations within the family is not adequate 
to protect the welfare of the elderly. In addition to the state, NGOs and the market are 
two actors that have an increasing role in the welfare distribution for the old. While non-
profit organizations seek to assist low-income elderly through cash and in kind aid, the 
market targets particularly the middle and upper middle-income elderly, through private 
social services, such as health care and private pension schemes.  
Both the Bretton Woods Institutions (the WB and IMF) and the EU advise the 
Turkish state, which has traditionally a moderate and fragmented role in welfare 
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distribution, to constitute a more sustainable and stronger pension system. As indicated in 
this chapter, while the former encourages the market involvement in pension plans, the 
latter urges the state to reach the social standards of the EU. Demographic ageing and 
increasing cost of old-age transfers from the public budget are the main problems which 
the state needs to consider in pension reforms.  
The 1999 and 2006 pension reforms are the result of aforementioned internal and 
external factors. The outcome of the pension reforms shows that these pension reforms 
were mainly implemented to achieve the recalibration of the Turkish pension system. 
Increases in the minimum retirement age and payment premium requirements, the 
modernization of the pension system, and unification of different social security 
institutions illustrate that recalibration is the most important target of this reform. Cost 
containment, such as decreasing the accrual rate, is also an important reform dynamic to 
reduce the increasing cost of pension transfers. Although recommodification exists 
through the introduction of private pension schemes, the relatively smaller number of 
people in private pension schemes demonstrates that recommodification is not the main 
factor in the pension reforms.  
Even though there have been important developments in the pension system 
towards achieving a sustainable and fair pension reform, the Turkish pension system has 
still some problems. The pension system is an obstacle to the expansion of the formal job 
opportunities for young people (see Table 4.10 for the percentage of workers who have 
social security coverage). Due to high social security contributions in the formal sector, 
the young retirees who have pension incomes and healthcare benefits continue to work 
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informally. However, the young have to find well-paid and secure jobs to guarantee their 
old-age income in a period which is marked by uncertainties and the state’s inability to 
ensure full-employment.  
It is worth mentioning that contrary to the general assumption that the elderly are 
a burden on society, downward social and financial transfers in families show that the 
elderly have a noteworthy role in the distribution of welfare across generations. In 
Turkey, generous occupation-based public pensions were constituted to provide 
minimum living standards for the elderly that were to be shared with young adults 
through downward financial transfers within the family.  
Due to their caring roles and structural barriers, women particularly face career 
interruptions and lower old-age benefits. Also, private pensions based on defined 
contribution systems will increase the gender inequality in the future. These challenges 
deepen gender and generational problems in the pension system. Also, the first tier of the 
pension structure, which provides very low means-tested benefits for the poor, does not 
really consider old-age poverty and equity issues. As Brook and Whitehouse (2006) 
illustrated, the means-tested pension benefits in Turkey, equal to 6 percent of average 
earnings, are extremely low compared to other OECD countries in 2005. Despite the high 
net pension replacement rates (for an average income earner it was one of the highest in 
the OECD region with 124.7, while the OECD average was 70.3 in 2009), Turkey had a 
higher gini coefficient for the elderly with 0.37 compared to the OECD average of 0.28  
in 2008 (OECD 2008a).  
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Pension policies and pension reforms cannot entirely be understood by financial 
and economic determinants. One needs to examine social and political factors which led 
to the pension reforms. The welfare regime approach provides considerable opportunities 
to understand pension reforms in Turkey and the welfare of the old in particular. 
Increasing social expenditures necessitate the state to collaborate with other actors. 
Indeed, a question that should be asked in order to understand the welfare of the elderly is 
not how the pension system should be reformed, but rather how the new Turkish welfare 
regime and its actors—the family, the state, the market, and local actors—should respond 
to the changing needs of the elderly.   
Unfortunately, there are many challenges in examining the role of the main pillars 
in welfare distribution. Data limitations on family structure, intergenerational transfers, 
income variations of pensioners, age structure of aid recipients assisted by NGOs, and 
occupations of people in the private pension system could be highlighted as some of the 
important data restrictions. Hence, TURSTAT should attempt to provide comparable 
statistical information for researchers at the EU level as well as OECD level. 
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4.6. Appendices 
Box 4.A.1. 
General Characteristics of the Recent Turkish Pension System 
Social security premium rates in 2011 
Old-age and disability insurance premium: 20 percent of employee’s total income (9 
percent paid by employee and 11 percent by employer) 
General health insurance premium: 12.5 percent of employee’s total income (5 percent 
paid by employee and 7.5 percent by employer) 
 
Qualifying conditions 
Pre-1999 reform (until 1999) 
Men: 1) 25 years of insurance coverage with 5,000 contribution days, or 2) age 55 with 
5,000 contribution days 
Women: 1) 20 years of insurance coverage with 5,000 contribution days, or 2) age 50 
with 20 years of insurance coverage. 
September 1999 - October 2008 (The 2006 reform became effective after October 
2008) 
Men: 1) Age 60 with 7,000 contribution days, or 2) age 60 with 25 years of insurance 
coverage and 4,500 contribution days. 
Women: 1) Age 58 with 20 years of insurance coverage 
After October 2008 
Men: 1) Age 60 with 25 years of insurance coverage and 9,000 contribution days (From 
2036 the age will begin to rise towards 65). 
Women: 1) Age 58 with 25 years of insurance coverage and 9,000 contribution days 
(Official retirement age for both sexes will be equalized at 65 in 2048). 
 
Benefit calculation 
Between September 1999 - October 2008 
The pension under the scheme is based on average lifetime earnings revalued in line with 
nominal GDP growth and the change of consumer price index (CPI) 
Benefit calculation formula:  [(1+GDP) x (1+CPI)].  
 
The accrual rates change for different years. The pension has a non-linear formula with 
years of coverage. 3.5 percent of income per annum in the first 10 years (3,600 days), 2 
percent of income  per annum for the next 15 years (5,400 days), and 1.5 percent of 
income per annum thereafter. 
After October 2008 
The pension income under the new system is based on average lifetime earnings revalued 
in line with nominal GDP growth and the change of consumer price index CPI  
Benefit calculation formula: [(1+CPI + %30 GDP)].  
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The accrual rates change for different years. The pension’s formula between 2008 and 
2015 is 2.5 percent of income for every year. Starting from 2016, the accrual rate will be 
fixed at 2 percent level. The pension’s formula is based on 2 percent of earnings per 
annum and it cannot exceed 90 percent of earnings before retirement.  
 
There is a floor above which contributions are required. This is 760 Turkish Lira (TL) for 
the second half of 2010. Also, the value of the ceiling to pensionable earnings was 4,943 
TL. 
 
The minimum pension income in June 2011 
SSK:         752 TL. 
Bağ-Kur:  450TL. 
ES:            900TL. 
 
The maximum pension income in June 2011 
SSK:         1,250 TL. 
Bağ-Kur:  1,648TL. 
ES:            4,135TL. 
 
Targeted 
The means-tested pension is payable only to those with no other social security rights 
who are disabled or those who have a low living standard aged 65 and over. In Turkey, 
about 22 percent of the elderly receive the means-tested pension. The means-tested 
pension is paid quarterly. For the second half of 2009 the pension was 94.8 TL per 
month. 
 
Early retirement 
Employees in specific industries (such as mining and military) and people with disability 
can retire early but other employees cannot claim pensions before the eligibility ages. 
 
Late retirement 
It is possible to postpone the pension beyond the normal pension age. 
 
Taxation and social security contributions of pensioners 
Pension income is not taxed. Pension income is not subject to social security 
contributions. Pension contribution rate (percent of gross earnings) is 20 percent of gross 
income of an employee.  
 
Dependants 
Unmarried female orphans are eligible for old-age pensions throughout their lives. Sons 
however, can receive benefits until adulthood. 
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Private pension plans 
In addition to some private sector corporations that run voluntary occupational pension 
funds for managerial positions, a new private pension system established in 2001 and 
became effective in 2003. The new private pension system is open to all adult 
participants, who take out contracts with a pension company. There are no employment 
relationship requirements. Also, employers can contribute to the individual pension 
accounts of their employees. There were about 2.4 million participants by the end of 
April 2011. There are currently 13 pension companies. 
 
Contributions and benefits in private pension plans 
At the end of 2007, the average monthly contribution was 112 TL. Members are entitled 
to retirement benefits when they reach the age of 56 and have been saving under the 
scheme for at least 10 years. Benefits can take the form of a lump sum or a monthly 
annuity. 
 
Taxation of private pension  
Participants may deduct contributions from their income tax base up to a maximum of 10 
percent of the gross monthly income. Investment returns are tax-exempt. As for benefits, 
where a participant withdraws benefits and has contributed to the system for less than 10 
years, they are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. Where the participant has contributed for 
more than 10 years, but is under 56, benefits are taxed at a rate of 10 percent. If the 
participant has contributed for more than 10 years and is 56 or older, benefits are taxed at 
3.75 percent.  
Sources: SSI 2011, http://sgk.gov.tr; OECD 2011: 314-315, OECD 2008: 288-290. 
 
 
Table 4.A.1. 
Revenues and Expenditures of Social Security Institutions 
 
Year 
Revenues 
(Million TL) 
Rate of 
Increase 
(%) 
Expenditures 
(Million TL) 
 Rate of 
Increase 
(%) 
Deficit 
(Million TL) 
Compensation 
Rate (%) 
  2 000 8,576  10,987  -2,411 78.1  
  2 001 13,361 55.8  17,831 62.3  -4,470 74.9  
  2 002 20,018 49.8  27,982 56.9  -7,964 71.5  
  2 003 27,917 39.5  41,336 48.0  -13,420 67.5  
  2 004 34,689 24.2  50,622 22.5  -15,932 68.5  
  2 005 41,249 18.9  59,941 18.4  -18,692 68.8  
  2 006 53,831 30.5  71,867 19.9  -18,037 74.9  
  2 007 56,875 5.66  81,915 13.9  -25,041 69.4  
  2 008 67,257 18.3  93,159 13.7  -25,902 72.2  
  2 009 78,073 16.1  106,775 14.6  -28,703 73.1  
  2 010 95,273 22.0  121,997 14.3  -26,724 78.1  
Source: http://sgk.gov.tr 
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Note: i) Selected countries: Canada [2006], Egypt [2008], Germany [2006], Italy [2005], Sweden [2006], 
Turkey [2007], United States [2006]. 
Source: World Values Survey Databank 2011, http://worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
 
 
Note: i) Selected countries: Canada [2006], Germany [2006], Italy [2005], Sweden [2006], Turkey [2007], 
United States [2006]. 
Source: World Values Survey Databank, 2011, http://worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
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Figure 4.A.2.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the period 1980-2010, the welfare state literature has been heavily centered on 
welfare state change. There are significant number of studies on the retrenchment of the 
welfare state and the welfare state crisis (O’Connor 1973; OECD 1981; Mishra 1984; 
Offe 1984; Mishra 1999). In light of those emphasizing the welfare state crisis, is 
Marshall (1964 [1950]) mistaken to suppose that modern citizenship based welfare rights 
is the final stage reached through a historical process of development of the civil rights, 
political rights, and finally social rights in three centuries? Then, is Polanyi (1957 [1944]) 
wrong to assume that the domination of the market on social relations through 
commodification of land, money and labour in the 19th century was diminished in the 20th 
century? Or to put it differently, is the market replacing the role of the welfare state? It 
seems to me, although these questions are very noteworthy and provocative, they do not 
help us to understand clearly the recent socio-economic developments due to too much 
focus on the welfare state. As I attempt to explain in this thesis, the focus of analysis 
should be the welfare regime, not the welfare state. Too much focus on the welfare state 
is a hindrance in understanding challenges to the welfare of populations across societies. 
As Esping-Andersen (1999: 4) highlighted, if there is any crisis, it springs from the 
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interaction “between the composite parts that, in unison, form contemporary welfare 
regimes”.  
The term welfare regime focuses on not only the state and its public expenditures, 
but also the market, the family, and local actors in welfare distribution. Hence, in the 
welfare regime approach, societies are grouped not only in terms of how their social 
policies are constructed by the welfare state, but also how other actors play roles in 
welfare distribution.  In fact, the questions that we should ask are: Which welfare regimes 
face which socio-economic challenges? What are the impacts of demographic and socio-
economic challenges on welfare actors and welfare regimes? What are the responses of 
welfare regimes to these challenges? Do different welfare regimes diverge or converge in 
this process? In light of pension policies, I have attempted to show that, while the 
challenges, such as demographic ageing, rising old-age expenditures, and new social risks 
are usually similar across industrialized countries, various welfare regimes have diverse 
solutions. 
Polanyi (1957 [1944]) was right to assert that the market was not the dominant 
power in social relations until the 19th century. Until the Second World War, families and 
local actors were main players in welfare distribution. As highlighted in the introduction 
chapter, the state and the market started to emerge as important welfare actors in the 
second half of the 19th century. The great depression and then the huge demolition in the 
Second World War had a crucial impact on the increasing role of the state in maintaining 
the welfare of their citizens across Europe and North America. As Esping-Andersen 
(1996: 3) asserted, many countries could achieve social security (welfare) and economic 
growth (efficiency) due to the social consensus between employees and employers based 
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on a full-employment promise in the postwar period. While private companies benefited 
from protectionist policies designed to discourage imports, workers had well-paid 
employment opportunities in the post-war era. 
In the beginning of the 21st century, there have been three main challenges— 
globalization, demographic changes, and new social risks—for welfare regimes (Pierson 
2007). First, globalization has given rise to various economic challenges to the economic 
system constructed after the Second World War. The production system has evolved 
from a Fordist one based on large stocks (just-in-case), standardized products, and mass 
production to the post-Fordist production system based on flexible machinery, lean 
production, minimal stocks (just-in-time), and differentiated products (Krahn et al. 2007). 
In addition, the characteristics of the labour market have changed since the late 1970s. 
According to Bell (1976), the world evolved from the industrial era to the post-industrial 
era. In the new era, the number of blue-collar workers in factories decreased, while the 
number of white-collar workers increased. According to Braverman (1974), with modern 
management techniques, the labour process became increasingly standardized and 
deskilled. Rifkin (2004 [1995]) interpreted technological developments and deskilling as 
the main characteristics of a new era in which fewer workers are needed to produce 
goods and services. In addition, competitive global trade and profit maximization goals 
led multinational companies to move their production to newly industrializing countries. 
The impact of outsourcing is especially significant on unskilled workers in the 
industrialized countries and their future pension incomes.  
Second, as observed in previous chapters, the continuing change in the 
demographic structure of the world’s population poses noteworthy challenges to 
  
141 
societies, in terms of meeting the needs of the ageing populations. As the post-war baby 
boom generation passed through various ages, it affected the relative size of the 
corresponding age group (Foot 1996). Population ageing has a negative effect on 
economic growth due to the old-age dependency ratio—the ratio of the population aged 
65 and older to the population aged 15-64. In the beginning of the 21st century, it is 
difficult for ageing populations to sustain generous retirement benefits and increasing 
health costs with slow economic growth (OECD 1998).  
Third, new social risks, particularly changes in family formation and “gender 
roles” pose important challenges to the welfare of people (Pierson 2007: 222-223). The 
rise in women’s labour force participation and their increasing roles in the work-force 
have challenged traditional “gender roles” in society as well as families. As highlighted 
in the fourth chapter, change in family formation is especially important to welfare 
distribution. Change in families could be analyzed through two main explanations: 
structural and cultural perspectives. While structural approaches mainly focus on macro 
social transformations, such as modernity and industrialization (Presser 2003; Crompton 
2006), the cultural approach focuses on changes within the family, such as social norms, 
the meaning of marriage, and changes in gender roles (Lesthaegue 1995; Beaujot 2000). 
Especially in the second half of the 20th century, in many industrialized countries, 
families underwent rapid changes, such as increased flexibility in modes of entry and 
exit, increased variability across families, changes in the social meaning of fatherhood 
and motherhood, and changed association between gender and family earnings.  
These contemporary changes pose challenges in the management of welfare 
states. Hence, the main issue for many welfare regimes is how to involve the various 
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welfare actors in welfare distribution. In addition, there are other problems. First, if the 
market plays an active role in welfare distribution, it may lead to increased social 
inequality. This is because the market cannot (does not) cover “bad risks” for people that 
are frequently “the ones that are most desperately in need” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 39). 
Second, if the family plays a more active role in welfare distribution, it would increase 
the burden on women and thus accentuate gender inequalities (Esping-Andersen et al. 
2002). For example, gender inequality is an important problem especially in the Southern 
European countries where families play strong roles in welfare distribution (see chapter 
4). Third, despite their noteworthy role in some cases, local actors have largely played a 
residual role in welfare distribution. Lack of comparative data on local actors makes it 
difficult to document the role of local actors in welfare distribution. As indicated in 
Chapter 4, however, they played a significant role in Turkey over the centuries.   
Hence, if focusing on other actors than the state in welfare distribution poses 
threats to social equality, what is the solution? One could argue that since it is very 
difficult for governments to retract social rights gained over decades, the welfare state 
will continue to play an important role in welfare distribution. As Esping-Andersen 
(2002: 13) has proposed, the choice of how to divide the responsibilities among welfare 
actors will be defined by institutional characteristics of welfare regimes. For example, as 
Myles and Pierson (2001) asserted, since pension systems are broad and deep, radical 
pension reforms face negative political reactions from the citizens.  
In effect, as some analysts have asserted, welfare regimes will mainly continue to 
follow their traditional welfare regime paths (Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999; Pierson et al. 
2001; Myles 2002; Anderson 2004; Aysan and Beaujot 2009; Aysan 2011). My thesis 
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shows how historical and institutional characteristics of welfare regimes are important in 
pension reforms across OECD countries, and how welfare regimes are stable and path 
dependent.  
In particular, Chapter 2 shows that there are three main findings with regard to 
institutional characteristics of welfare regimes based on results of cluster analysis. First, 
cluster analysis findings confirm a four-fold pension typology. Hence, it reveals that 
pension policy characteristics of countries can be described by referring to the much 
more general welfare regime typology. Second, the findings of institutional pension 
characteristics support that, contrary to the convergence thesis which asserts convergence 
of welfare regimes as a result of neo-liberal policies, different welfare regimes have 
followed their welfare regime paths in pension policies. Third, there are significant 
differences among welfare regimes in terms of pension outcomes for gender and 
generations. The Social Democratic and Continental European countries have some 
similarities with regards to the different pension policy dimensions and inequalities. The 
Continental European countries have higher employee costs, generous pension benefits 
and high levels of labour market exclusion for younger cohorts. The Southern European 
countries have generous pension replacement rates, higher public old-age spending and 
pension level, but higher old-age poverty rates, and pension inequalities. The Liberal 
countries have higher official retirement age, labour force participation, and pension 
inequalities, but lower public old-age spending and pension levels. The Social 
Democratic group succeeds best in minimizing gender inequality in old-age, while the 
Liberal and the Southern European welfare regimes have high old-age gender inequality.  
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Chapter 3 focuses on recent trends in pension policies in OECD countries in light 
of both demographic ageing and path dependency associated with the welfare regime 
typology. All four welfare regimes face demographic ageing, but the Social Democratic 
countries have shown greater ability to influence the level of childbearing (McDonald 
2006), along with an interest in maximizing labour force participation of both sexes to 
pay for generous social entitlements. With their differential treatment of different groups 
in society, the Continental and the Southern European countries have the most difficulty 
in achieving reforms, and they also face the highest rates of population ageing. The 
pension reforms of the Liberal countries focus on greater privatization. While the state 
plays a noteworthy role in the retirement and pension systems in the Social Democratic 
countries, the market remains the key actor in the Liberal countries. In other Southern 
European countries, however, the family still plays key roles in caring for the elderly. 
Chapter 4 is a case study to understand the transformations of welfare regimes 
and the effects of pension policies on the welfare of the old. This chapter shows that the 
Turkish welfare regime is undergoing transformation. Traditional Turkish families, the 
main actor in welfare distribution, have been challenged by cultural and economic 
dynamics. These challenges not only influence traditional families but also the Turkish 
welfare regime in general and the welfare of the old in particular. In addition to the state, 
the market is a welfare player that has an increasing role in welfare distribution including 
pensions and health care. While the market targets particularly upper middle-income 
elderly, non-profit organizations assist low-income elderly. In spite of major pension 
reforms that aim to achieve a sustainable and fair pension system, the Turkish pension 
system has still some problems. The pension system is an obstacle to the expansion of the 
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formal job opportunities for women and youth, which poses a threat to gender and 
generational equalities. In a more fragile employment market, it might be difficult for 
women and younger generations to find a well-paid and secure job for 25 years.   
During the last two decades of the 20th century, a neo-liberal ideology challenged 
the legitimacy of the welfare state through economic globalization and labour market 
transformations (Moreno and Palier 2004). Following the reform proposals of the World 
Bank, the IMF, and other international organizations, the most frequent path for pension 
policy reform was the implementation of private pension schemes as a supplement to 
PAYG public pension schemes. Even though defined contribution private pension 
schemes are important income resources for many retirees, there are significant critiques 
to these plans due to low returns and high operation costs. Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) 
showed that private pension schemes are not always the right direction for the welfare of 
the old.  
Contrary to neo-liberal convergence thesis, path dependency approach is mostly 
used to show institutional variations across welfare states (Myles and Pierson 2001). As 
asserted in this thesis, despite neo-liberal challenge to welfare regimes, pension reforms 
have been influenced by their institutional paths that are differentiated across welfare 
regimes. However, it should also be noted that small institutional changes might be of 
little consequence in the short run, given the institutions that are already in place, but in 
the long run they could lead to something completely different (see Palier et al. 2010). 
This thesis suggests that various welfare regimes have developed their own 
approaches to pension systems and pension reforms based on their institutional paths. 
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The Social Democratic countries mostly focus on cost containment and to some extent 
recalibration, while the Liberal countries mostly focus on re-commodification and to 
some extent cost containment. The Continental European countries mostly focus on cost 
containment but recalibration and re-commodification are also important considerations. 
The Southern European countries mostly focus on recalibration but cost containment and 
re-commodification are also important factors. 
The welfare regime typology based on “ideal types” has some explanatory value 
for cross-national analyses (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 13) and it is useful for mapping the 
field of social policy (Beland 2010: 40). It is important to bear in mind that although 
these alternative typologies have been subject to some empirical analyses, they are 
generally based on theoretical assumptions. The empirical validity of Esping-Andersen’s 
classification, as well as that of other researchers, might be criticized for methodological 
limitations and limited theoretical reasoning (Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Scruggs and 
Allan 2006). Despite the significant number of critiques, some studies support Esping-
Andersen’s typology (Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001; Powell and Barrientos 2004). Most of 
these studies depend on factor analysis or cluster analysis that are better techniques to 
cluster welfare states than Esping-Andersen’s ordinary least square regression methods. 
In addition to Esping-Andersen’s threefold typology, the welfare state literature 
includes other welfare state taxonomies. Focusing on welfare of the old and pension 
policies, this thesis contributes to the literature by emphasizing the Southern European 
welfare regime as a distinct fourth cluster through its unique institutional and social 
characteristics. The Southern European welfare regime can be seen as a distinctive type 
of welfare regime with mixed features of Beveridgean universal national health services 
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and Bismarckian income transfers (Ferrera 1996). As shown in the fourth chapter, the 
Southern European welfare regime is proposed as a separate cluster based on highly 
fragmented and unsystematic pension system. This regime is based on a strong role of the 
family in welfare distribution for all age groups and the moderate role of the state in 
welfare of the old. Unlike other welfare regimes, patronage and clientelism are two 
indirect welfare distribution mechanisms in this group. 
In this thesis, I have used a four-fold welfare regime typology based on “ideal 
types” to examine pension policies across OECD countries. This thesis shows that 
pension regimes largely follow this welfare regime typology. However, as many 
researchers have highlighted, there could be more variations among (for a discussion see 
Arts and Gelissen 2002, and for the list alternative welfare regimes see Bambra 2007) 
and within welfare regimes (e.g. Myles 1998) and the “real world” of welfare states is 
likely to show more complex and hybrid forms. Hence, further research is needed in 
order to understand variations in welfare distribution, particularly in pension policies, 
across countries. In fact, there have been four main problems or limitations in welfare 
regime research that have also influenced this thesis.  
First, methodological problems in welfare regime research (for discussions see 
Shalev 1999 and Scruggs and Allan 2006) and data limitations pose significant threats to 
welfare regime research. For example, Shalev (1999) criticizes Esping-Andersen’s 
analysis as heavily based on his personal judgments on welfare states without any 
systematic statistical test, while some researchers question the goodness-of-fit of his 
typology (Obinger and Wagschal 2001). In addition, lack of cross-national comparative 
data makes analyzing various countries and their social policies difficult. OECD presents 
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the most extensive comparative data on social policies, namely the OECD Social 
Expenditure database. In addition, the SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing, and 
Retirement in Europe) data on health, ageing, and retirement, offer important statistics on 
European societies. However, both of these databases cover mostly industrialized 
European and North American countries. While OECD data cover 33 OECD countries 
for the period 1980-2007, the third wave of the SHARE data covers only 15 European 
countries. In addition, there is very limited information on the role of other welfare 
actors, such as the family and local actors in welfare distribution.  
Second, most of the comparative welfare regime studies focus on public 
expenditures and state policies in welfare distribution. However, as indicated in this 
thesis, other welfare actors—namely the market, the family, and local actors—also play 
important roles in welfare distribution. Since this thesis has particularly examined public 
pension policies, it has mostly focused on the state policies. Further research is needed to 
understand how welfare is distributed by various actors especially for various age groups. 
If we consider that welfare historically was mainly distributed by families and local 
actors in history, future research should pay further attention to these pillars.  
Third, most of the studies on welfare regimes and particularly pension policies 
scrutinize Europe and North America.  However, there are few studies analyzing the 
welfare of the elderly and pension systems in newly industrializing countries (e.g. Gough 
2001). In addition, welfare regimes of these countries and their responses to challenges of 
population ageing are generally overlooked in the welfare state literature. Chapter 4 has 
attempted to broaden the welfare regime literature by examining the Turkish welfare 
regime. However, we need further comparative research particularly on East Asia, 
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Eastern Europe, and Middle East which have diverse historical and institutional 
characteristics affecting welfare distribution.   
Fourth, one of the most important problems is little systematic attention to gender 
in the welfare regime literature (Orloff 1996: 65; Benoit 2000: 21). Some analysts argue 
that although the welfare state is particularly produced and consumed by women, it is 
analyzed through male centered explanations (for discussions see Pierson 2007: 67-77). 
An inadequate theorization of gender in welfare regime research and a failure to specify 
the features of welfare provisions are the main problems of welfare state studies and 
particularly Esping-Andersen’s typology (Orloff 1996; O’Connor et al. 1999). Hence, in 
order to understand the effect of gender on welfare distribution and public policies, one 
needs to analyze the role of gender in welfare regimes. Even though this thesis has paid 
particular focus on gender in welfare regimes and pension policies, further research is 
needed to understand how gender questions play vital roles in the welfare of societies, 
particularly in the welfare of the old. 
In light of aforementioned problems, further research is needed to elaborate the 
welfare regime research. Certainly the challenges to the welfare regime studies are 
multiple and any research contributing to the literature must have a broader perspective. 
It seems to me, comparative welfare regime research is particularly needed to understand 
how various welfare regimes have formed various responses to the similar socio-
economic challenges in the 21st century. 
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